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1. Problem Field  
 
Germany, being the largest economy in Europe, and fifth largest economy in the 
world
1
, is among the most important economic players within the European Union 
(EU), as it presents one of the largest trading partners and import markets of other 
European economies. However, Germany’s growth performance since its 
reunification has been sluggish, with only 1.51% average annual growth rate of real 
gross domestic product (GDP) during the period 1991-2008. The real GDP growth 
rate in all subsequent years since 1995 was below the rest of the euro-area (graph 1). 
Graph 1: Real GDP in the Euro Area Excluding Germany and Germany 
 
Source: EUROSTAT 
 
This happened, despite the growth of labour productivity per person was at roughly 
the same level with the rest of the euro area (graph 2). According to the Economist 
Intelligence Unit (EIU, 2008: 21), the weak growth performance in the 1990s can be 
attributed to the economic shock of reunification that manifested itself through the 
recession in 1993. 
 
                                                
1
 CIA the World Factbook - https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/gm.html  
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Graph 2: Labour Productivity in the Euro Area Excluding Germany and Germany  
 
Note: Labour productivity is measured as real GDP per person employed 
Source: EUROSTAT 
 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) argues that 
the reason for the low growth performance can be found in the decline of Germany’s 
potential growth:  
“Following a prolonged period of stagnation, Germany has been enjoying a vigorous 
recovery. Business and government finances are robust, laying a solid foundation for a 
continuation of the upswing provided that headwinds from the global financial market 
turmoil do not become overwhelming. Nevertheless, for high economic growth to last 
beyond the cyclical upswing, it will be necessary to raise the growth rate of potential 
output.” (OECD, 2008: 8) 
 
The argument is that the decline in potential growth is attributed to the slowdown in 
labour productivity: 
“This decline is mainly attributable to a decrease in trend labour productivity growth 
of the same magnitude, which occurred during the current decade: there has been no 
growth in trend total hours worked over this period (the decline in the 1990s being 
compensated for by the increase in recent years), with the result that growth in 
potential GDP was equal to labour productivity growth both in the early1990s and in 
recent years.” (OECD, 2008: 29) 
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The recipe for lifting potential growth and thereby reaching sustained actual growth 
rate calls, as suggested by the OECD, for structural reforms, especially concerning the 
labour market: 
“These challenges require new reform efforts in some areas, such as reducing barriers 
to taking up work for second-earners and reforming employment protection legislation 
for regular work contracts. In other areas it should be ensured that past reforms are 
not rolled back and that the reform drive is maintained. This relates above all to past 
increases in work incentives for the long-term unemployed and measures to phase out 
early retirement options for older workers. Also, potential negative employment effects 
associated with the introduction of minimum wages should be minimised.” (OECD, 
2008:  69) 
 
The supply side view maintains that structural reforms are the key for increasing 
potential growth rate, which should result in an increase of the actual growth rate. 
However, these reforms have already been implemented in order to improve 
Germany’s international competitive position and in the aftermath of these reforms 
growth and employment (graph 3) was still lagging behind.  
 
Graph 3: Total Employment in the Euro Area Excluding Germany and Germany 
 
Source: EUROSTAT 
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Employment from 2001 to 2006 was almost stagnant even though most of the reforms 
were focused on the labour market and lowering labour costs. The unemployment rate 
(graph 4) declined to slightly above its 1991 level in 1999, subsequently it surged 
again to its peak in 2004, and declined to its 1999 level in 2007. These observation 
present peculiar developments if the growth was purely constrained by supply factors.   
 
Graph 4: Unemployment Rate in Germany 
 
Source: OECD 
 
Furthermore, policy recommendation attribute rather small attention to the effect of 
demand on growth as can be seen with OECD’s stance: 
“Past achievements in fiscal consolidation need to be preserved. With the structural 
budget now in balance, the challenge is to avoid pro-cyclical policies and to deal with 
the long-term fiscal challenges of ageing. Replacing the current fiscal rule, which has 
proved to be ineffective, with the requirement of a structural budget balance in line 
with the Stability and Growth Pact should be considered.” (OECD, 2008:  8) 
 
The OECD’s view shows a supply side perspective focusing on the structural 
adjustments, and balanced budget. 
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 The European Central Bank (ECB), on the other hand, represents a much more 
radical supply side view advocating further structural reforms and balanced budget, 
which resulted in the call for enforcing budget deficit requirement of Maastricht treaty 
on Germany in December 2005 (Werner in Hein & Truger ed., 2007:186). In addition, 
the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (ECFIN), in its analysis 
suggests that the Germany’s labour costs are still high, but due to social contributions: 
“By international standards, and also in relation to domestic earnings, social benefits 
have been relatively generous in terms of both level and duration, thereby also 
requiring high rates of social contributions, which drive a wedge between (high) 
labour costs for the employer and (low) take-home pay for the employee, creating 
strong disincentives for the former to recruit and for the latter to take up work, 
particularly where low-paying jobs are concerned.” (ECFIN, 2007b:  3)  
 
At the core of the problem lies the hypothesis that when the growth and employment 
are dragged down for a long period, labour market rigidities are the cause and public 
sector investments (especially deficit financing) are counter productive and result in 
the inflation and crowding-out of private investments. However, another hypothesis is 
that the demand factors are constraining the growth of employment and GDP. In this 
case it is not just the question of conducting structural reforms, but also combining 
demand side policy with the structural reforms.  
 In 2003 Germany started conducting extensive labour market reforms, and 
social security reforms laid through the reform program Agenda 2010, but the effect 
of these reforms did not materialize until two years later (Horn in Hein & Truger ed., 
2007: 160). One of the arguments is that the supply side policies need time to 
materialize, but little is said about the question can these policies restrain economy, 
and actually aggravate slumps if not followed by appropriate fiscal and monetary 
stimulus.  
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 The theoretical underpinning behind the neoclassical theory is that there is one 
unique potential rate of growth, and the theory presumes that market forces are able to 
converge an actual output with the level of potential output. Thereby during 
prolonged periods of slow growth the problem has to be within labour market 
rigidities, or excessive expenditures that crowd out investments. The whole scope of 
causality derives from accruing more factor inputs and making them more productive 
as that will result in higher potential and thereby actual growth. And it does not 
explain why Germany is growing slower than the rest of the euro area, despite their 
similar pace in growth of labour productivity. 
 In addition, the OECD acknowledges that the EU 11
2
 has also experienced 
drop in labour productivity:  
“While hourly labour productivity growth in the EU 11 has also declined from around 
2% to 1 ! per cent, this effect on the potential growth rate has been offset by rising 
trend total hours worked. Even though labour productivity growth developments have 
been similar, the decline in the EU 11 labour productivity growth rate reflects not only 
a lower contribution from capital deepening, as in Germany, but also a decrease in 
MFP growth, in contrast to Germany.” (OECD, 2008: 29) 
 
This is a counter-argument from the OECD’s side to the standard direction of 
causality in the neoclassical theory. More hours worked can only materialize if there 
is a demand influence on potential growth, as it essentially represents an increase in 
employment. If that is the case, why are the policies still focusing on structural 
reforms and not demand stimulus? Moreover, if there is a demand influence on 
potential growth rate (meaning that the actual growth rate can drag potential growth 
rate in either direction) the neoclassical approach becomes a poor tool for analysis. 
The neoclassical approach is essentially concerned with how to reach a higher steady 
state growth rate but not what happens if the economy is out of a steady state.  
                                                
2
 EU 11 does not include Germany, and excludes Austria, Luxembourg and Portugal as data for the last 
three are missing   
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 Regardless of the refined level of arguments by the OECD, the question 
remains why the growth is lower in Germany despite implementation of structural 
reforms, improvements in net exports and labour productivity being at par with the 
rest of the euro-area? 
1.1. The Main Research Question  
 
This report starts by trying to investigate whether demand constraints presented a 
significant problem for the economic growth in Germany in the time period after the 
reunification. Thereby, the main research question is formulated as follows: 
 
Did the demand factors significantly constrain the growth performance of German 
economy in the time period after reunification? 
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2. Approach 
 
The analytical approach of this report is based on the Critical Realist school of 
thought, and as such, the report strives to achieve correspondence between the 
observable reality and the theories and methods used to explain the reality (Jespersen, 
2009).  
The goal of the Critical Realist analysis is to develop a deeper understanding 
of socio-economic phenomenon that is in focus of the research, rather than trying to 
predict future development. The starting philosophical assumption is that socio-
economic relations exist independent of the researcher (Jespersen, 2009). In addition, 
what can be observed is only a part of reality while the deeper causal mechanisms 
remain obscure to initial observations. Furthermore, the socio economic relations 
evolve over time, meaning ultimately, that the future is uncertain, and that each socio-
economic phenomenon has to be analysed in regards to the specific context of social 
and institutional arrangements in the particular historic timeline. Thereby, the analysis 
has to regard an economic system as an open system, where the future is ultimately 
uncertain and no clear-cut predictions about future can be derived (Sayer, 1992: 115-
117). The aim is to gain insight into the causal relations that govern the behaviour of 
socio-economic phenomena, not the mathematical precision. As Andrew Sayer 
pointed out, mathematical language is acausal and astructural. Mathematical functions 
can only relate quantitative variations among variables, but do not offer the direction 
of causality (Sayer, 1992: 179).  
Due to the above mentioned, it is crucial that theoretical assumptions are 
based on the real world observations and not ideally perceived world. Thereby, the 
Critical Realist analysis starts from the ontological level, rather than epistemological 
level. Roy Bashkar postulated that the ontological level consists of three domains 
(Danermark, 2001: 20-21): the empirical, the actual, and the deeper level of 
understanding, or real level. The empirical domain is based on either the direct or 
indirect observations of the phenomenon. The actual domain consists of underlying 
structures and tendencies that can be identified in relation to the particular 
macroeconomic phenomenon, while the deeper domain contains mechanisms and 
 11 
forces that generate its specific behaviour. Since the macroeconomic analysis is 
situated at the epistemological level (theories and methods), it is crucial that the 
starting point of the analysis is within the ontological domain. The link between the 
ontological and epistemological levels is maintained throughout the analysis 
(Jespersen, 2009). Maintaining the link is necessary, as theories make an abstracted 
conceptualization of reality, but as they abstract, they remove the system from reality, 
and run close to explaining abstraction rather than reality (Sayer, 1992: 1-6).  
 
2.1. Assumptions 
 
Economic growth is often defined as the increase in the total value added of all final 
goods and services produced and exchanged on a market within the country in a given 
time period. A problem arises when the question of what determines the pace of 
economic expansion is taken into consideration. One understanding of the 
determinants of economic growth is to view an economy from a closed system 
perspective, stress the importance of productive capacity and presume that what is 
produced is in the same time consumed. Such abstraction might yield a relevant result 
if we imagine an economy as the closed system with perfectly functional markets that 
correctly set the prices, and reduce the behaviour of various economic actors to be 
purely driven by economic rationality with the perfect foresight into the future. Then 
the main problem for economic policy makers becomes the most efficient allocation 
of factor inputs that will yield the greatest increase of potential output. Usually, 
mainstream, neoclassical economics, more or less, takes this stance in analyzing the 
determinants of economic growth. Though there are tendencies to include reality in 
the analysis, mainstream theory is based on deductive instrumentalist approach, where 
the choice of hypothesis is based on their ability to give accurate predictions, and 
calculate the new values of equilibrium, than to explain reality (Lavoie, 2006:7). By 
choosing deductive approach and a set of unrealistic assumptions the link between 
ontological level and epistemological level is severed (Jespersen , 2009). 
When distinguishing between the long-run and short-run, the long-run in 
neoclassical sense can be defined as the state of fully realized expectations (Lavoie, 
2006: 103), mostly these expectations are related to price and inflation. This would 
make assumptions that actors are being able to foresee the future, and that prices are 
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able to transfer precise information about the value of goods and services produced 
without regard to time. Consequence is that the short run is characterized by imperfect 
information and adjustments in expectations, while in the long run the things 
eventually readjust to a stable equilibrium path.  
However, neither in the short, nor the long run can be argued that the 
expectations are always fully realized. Any new development in technology, or 
institutional arrangement represents a cause of uncertainty, and it is unpredictable 
how it will affect the world in the future. In reaching a decision economic agents rely 
on a current set of available information, and are not able to foresee future events. 
Once a decision is taken and implemented it is irreversible, or the cost of reversing it 
are high, which is especially the case with fixed costs (Lavoie, 2006: 14). The 
principles by which prices are formed can be changed as the technology, norms and 
rules on these markets change, or even as new goods and products enter the markets. 
Thereby, the information prices can convey will always be imperfect. As principles 
that govern price formation on different markets differ, there is a reason to believe 
that there exists a substantial time lag between a change of prices on one market and 
adjustment of prices on other markets. Thus, to reach any meaningful explanations the 
notion of price flexibility cannot be taken a priori as the basis of the argument.   
 When the assumption of the stability of markets is considered, it is rather 
dubious. Markets are not product of an ideal mechanic world, they are product of 
human interaction, and as such they present institutional arrangement impacted by 
human behaviour. Thereby, if we consider institutions as being consisted of both 
formal and informal rules, regulations and institutional policy arrangements define 
only the formal rules and norms under which markets operate. No matter how 
minimal these formal rules are, the informal norms and rules also govern institutional 
behaviour. If markets were imperfect in the short run, it would be naïve to argue that 
only formal norms and rules are responsible for imperfections. Thus, it would be as 
well naïve to assume that in the long run market forces are able to create perfect 
equilibrium if informal norms and rules are hiding imperfections and causing market 
failures. 
Behaviour of actors can be argued to be rational but only in the situation 
where the information is available. If information is incomplete, or non-existing, 
actors cannot reach rational decisions. Their decisions are more likely to be based on 
a limbo of expected outcomes in the future, which varies from an actor to an actor. 
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Thus, the macroeconomic behaviour of actors cannot be perceived as the sum of 
atomistic tendencies.  
If previous suggestions are accepted, the context of reality which economic 
analysis tries to explain sets each economy to operate in international environment 
characterized by different institutional arrangements, with no perfect insight into the 
future, imperfect markets, and only a partial ability of actors to be rational. Thereby, 
the analysis has to incorporate the problems of not just production and allocation of 
factor inputs, but the question of distribution of income, historical context, role of 
institutions, uncertainty, and drop the analytical notion of atomistic rational actors. 
Consequently, the analysis has to explore the possibility that institutional 
arrangements, distribution issues and demand constrains can actually restrain 
economic performance before the supply constrains bite. Thus, the principle of 
effective demand is relevant for the analysis, both, in the short and long run.  
 
2.1.1. Concepts of Institutions, Structural Reforms, Potential and Natural 
Rate of Growth  
 
The institutions influence the behaviour of actors as they represent a set of formal and 
informal norms and rules that consist of a particular set of conventions under which 
actors exchange information, reach decisions and implement actions. The institutional 
arrangements, thereby, can constrain the scope of actions, which actors could take, as 
some actions are sanctioned by both formal and informal norms and rules. In addition, 
institutions serve as a source of information, and as a transmission mechanism of 
information, since they distribute the information to actors and influence the way 
information are received by actors (Ferreiro & Serrano in Hein & Truger, ed., 2007: 
143). Both formal and informal norms and rules influence the way individuals form 
objectives, and define the property of transmitting information to other actors. In this 
context the change of institutions also affects the way actors form expectations. Thus, 
within the analysis, the institutional change is incorporated through the notion of 
historic time, meaning that actions of actors are not just bound by their previous 
decisions, but also by the evolution of institutional arrangements.  
As the economic policy debate concerning Germany extensively focuses on 
the notion of structural reforms, there is a need to define these more precisely. 
 14 
Structural reforms can be understood as “an institutional change that changes 
individual behavioural incentives in a growth promoting way” (Horn, in Hein & 
Truger, ed.2007: 159). Part of these reforms is usually targeted at the labour market, 
where the stress is put on downsizing social protection and unemployment benefits in 
order to promote labour market flexibility. These labour market changes are usually 
coupled with privatization of public sector institutions with an aim to shrink the size 
of government sector and increase the size of private sector. In addition the budgetary 
discipline is coupled with these reforms as it is presumed that government 
intervention is counterproductive in promoting growth.  
The third concept of importance is the concept of potential output that is 
important for the conduct of the analysis, and for assessing usefulness of the policy 
recommendations steaming from its interpretation. Potential output represents the 
highest level of GDP growth that can be sustained over prolonged period of time 
without inflationary pressure. The OECD defines potential output as: “[…] the level 
of output that an economy can produce at a constant inflation rate”
3
, meaning that 
the potential output depends upon: “[…] the capital stock, the potential labour force 
(which depends on demographic factors and on participation rates), the non-
accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU), and the level of labour 
efficiency.”
4
 The potential output is a development of the concept of the natural 
growth rate, which was introduced in growth theory by Roy Harrod in 1939, and it is 
defined as: “[…] the maximum rate of growth allowed by the increase of population, 
accumulation of capital, technological improvement and the work/ leisure preference 
schedule, supposing that there is always full employment in some sense. (Harrod, 
1939: 30). The natural rate of growth represents a production frontier for the 
economy, and in Harrod’s sense can be expressed as the increase in labour force and 
increase in labour productivity. The main difference between Harrod’s and OECD’s 
definition is that the later determines potential output to include level of employment 
that is consistent with non-accelerating inflation. Solow (1956), originally used the 
concept of the natural growth rate in his neoclassical growth model, but subsequently 
in the neoclassical theory, the natural growth rate was replaced with the potential 
output. Both concepts will be used throughout the report, however, the reader should 
                                                
3
 http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=2094  
4
 http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=2094  
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be aware that most of the discussion in theoretical framework would evolve around 
the natural growth rate.    
 
2.2. Method   
 
In order to ensure that the link between the ontological and epistemological level is 
maintained the study uses a retroductive approach, which is combination of inductive 
and deductive approaches. 
The inductive circle starts with an insight into empirical domain by obtaining 
measurements of Germany’s economic performance through few central 
macroeconomic variables, namely balance of payments, GDP growth, employment, 
productivity, and income distribution. By obtaining these measurements the 
contextualization of the GDP growth pattern with the tendency of the general 
economic change is done through historical timeline. This constitutes a 
macroeconomic landscape that serves as the basis for creating the problem field and 
formulating the main research question. However, the time sequence of institutional 
arrangements also needs to be taken into the consideration, as Germany became a part 
of the Euro-zone and there was also internal change of labour market institutions 
during the time period in focus. This allows a rough overview that serves to complete 
the focus of the study and form initial research questions. 
In order to establish a link between the ontological level of reality, with the 
epistemological level, the theories that are applied need to be coincided with 
macroeconomic landscape. Thus, it is possible to obtain an overview over the 
problem field and isolate probable determinants of economic growth performance. 
The deductive cycle starts by the choice of theories and models that allow formulation 
of hypothesis based on actual tendencies of German economy, and consequently 
testing this set of hypothesis on gathered empirical data. Depending on acceptance or 
rejection of hypothesis it is possible to readjust theoretical explanation and derive an 
interpretation of reality, which still will be conditioned upon the abstractions made. 
The study investigates both supply and demand constrains impact on economic 
growth in Germany, where the analytical weight is given to the analysis of demand 
constraints bearing in mind the institutional context and historic timeline as the 
important determinants of the system.  
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2.2.1. Initial Observations and Research Questions 
 
The economic landscape of Germany signified the paradox of labour productivity 
growth being at pair with the rest of the euro-area, but the growth of GDP lagged 
behind. The aim of the study is to explain the reasons for this development, and to 
raise a theoretical discussion about the direction of causality between the potential 
growth rate (or natural growth rate) and the actual growth rate. This discussion is 
central as in the mainstream neoclassical understanding long run growth is determined 
by accumulation and productivity of factor inputs, while the Post-Keynesian theory 
conforms the hypothesis that demand plays a role both in the short and long run. The 
research questions steaming from the initial observations are grouped into three 
groups considering: demand side, theoretical implications, and economic policy. 
When the aggregate demand is taken into consideration there is a rather bleak 
development of domestic demand, consisted of gross fixed investments, government 
consumption expenditure and private final consumption. Gross investments 
contracted in 1993, while the growth of private consumption and government 
consumption expenditures slowed down, while external component of demand, export 
contracted sharply during 1991-1993. After 1994 private consumption did not grow at 
a high pace, and government consumption expenditures where developing at a slower 
pace from 2000, while in 1995-1996 investments growth was stagnant. From 2001 
investment growth contracted again significantly followed by slowdown and 
contraction of private consumption and rather slow growth of government 
consumption expenditures, which also contracted in 2004. The development of 
government expenditures indicates relatively tight fiscal policy during the recession 
of 2002.  
The development of these indicators might indicate that the cause of the slow 
pace of economic growth can be the domestic demand. However, as exports present 
important component of aggregate demand development in Germany the drop of 
demand from export markets in 2000 can play a role. The previous considerations 
served to form following questions: 
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• Why output growth and employment are lagging compared to the rest of the EU 
despite similar pace of productivity growth?  
• Did the fiscal tightening and restraining wage growth have a negative effect on 
growth of output and employment? 
• Were the net exports, which generated surplus on the current account from the 
year 2000, enough to result in greater growth rate?  
• What is the consequence of the endogenous potential growth rate, which is 
determined by the actual growth for conduct of macroeconomic policy in 
Germany? (This question is not to a full extent answered but only taken as 
theoretical standpoint) 
 
The observation of unemployment and employment development brings a possibility 
of both supply and demand constrains being at play. Employment level in Germany 
was contracting from its reunification, and the level of 1991 was only reached in 
2000, while afterwards the employment level again began to shrink. In the same time 
unemployment rose from around 6% to around 9% during 1991-1996, followed by the 
period of decline to around 7.5% until 2000, while afterwards steadily increasing to 
around 10.5% in 2004. From 2005 to 2007 unemployment level dropped roughly to a 
level it had in 1991. This raises the questions about the causes of unemployment and 
labour market flexibility, as well a disparity in employment levels between East and 
West Germany. It is especially relevant as Germany started implementing extensive 
reforms of labour market institutions and social security during 2003-2005 (Horn, 
Gustav A in Hein & Truger, ed.2007: 159), which led to the following research 
question: 
• What is the cause of the stagnant employment during this period? 
 
The previous research questions raised the concerns about the conduct of economic 
policy in Germany and its consequence on economic growth: 
• Was the economic policy in Germany conducted in pro-cyclical or 
counter-cyclical manner? 
• Do the structural reforms and wage moderation increase the potential 
growth without negatively affecting actual growth? 
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2.2.2. Design of the Study 
 
Having outlined the economic landscape, problem field and research questions it is 
possible to present retroductive design of the study. The problem field and research 
question groups are broken into the three analytical blocks as depicted by the figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Design of the Study 
 
Macroeconomic landscape:  
Served as the preliminary 
survey on possible causes of 
economic slowdown and was 
the basis for the problem field   
Discussion on the 
implications of economic 
policy 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
The main research question: 
Did the demand factors 
significantly constrain the growth 
performance of German 
economy in the time period after 
reunification? 
 
Analysis of the structural 
problems in the labour market 
as the main growth constraint  Analysis of the policy 
constraints on Germany’s 
growth performance 
Analysis of the income 
distribution as the determinant 
of growth performance in 
Germany 
Analysis of Demand Constrains 
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2.2.2.1. First Analytical Block 
 
The first block is designed to test the explanatory ability of neoclassical approach in 
explaining the cause of sluggish growth performance of Germany. The general 
problem with this approach is that it is ill suited to explain the performance of the 
economy that is running below full capacity, without taking into regards factors not 
captured by a model. If the standard growth accounting technique is used it will 
breakdown the growth into the contribution of labour, capital and total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth. The TFP within neoclassical model should capture the 
increase of output that is neither influenced by labour nor capital contribution (Solow, 
1956). This indicator might be interpreted as an indirect measurement of 
technological development, but it depends on how capital and labour contribution is 
calculated. It essentially represents a measure of everything that is not accounted for 
by accumulation of capital and labour, and it thereby the whole approach seems rather 
analytically unsuited to represent reality at hand.  
In addition, the neoclassical analysis, built around Solow model (Solow, 
1956), threats this rate as being unique exogenous variable, meaning that in modelling 
it is presumed that market forces cannot influence the production frontier. In the same 
time in neoclassical sense the market forces eventually coincide the level of actual 
output to the level of potential output. The consequence is that a neoclassical view 
holds that the potential growth path is determined by supply constrains, thus structural 
reforms are advised to lift the production frontier growth rate. Thereby, this block will 
consist of theoretical discussion and is matched with empirical data concerning labour 
productivity, employment and growth compared to other countries within the euro 
zone, by holding in regard that Germany was conducting such reforms since early 
1990s.  
2.2.2.2. Second Analytical Block 
 
The second analytical block is consisted of two underlying sub-blocks investigating 
importance of demand constraints. It is aimed to challenge the usually assumed 
causality that the potential growth rate determines the actual growth rate. In essence 
this approach would indirectly treat potential growth rate as endogenous, and from 
operational side bring demand development as a rather important contributor in 
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determining the overall growth of the economy. Thereby, the reader should be aware 
that it implies the natural rate of growth not to be unique and that both supply and 
demand influence its development, but such causality will not be tested.  
Theoretical basis is found by Thirlwall (Thirlwall & Leon-Ledesma, 2002), 
who explored a possibility of endogeneity of the natural growth, and he also found 
empirical evidence. The implication of considering the natural growth rate as 
dependent on the actual is bringing much greater focus on the income distribution 
issues. Furthermore, various demand constrains can bite before the full employment is 
reached. This implies that the growth can be wage-lead and that the change of income 
distribution that negatively affects wage share can have dampening effect on 
productivity and demand growth, which further reinforce each other (Hein & 
Tarassow, 2008: 34).  
Thereby, the second analytical block aims to explore the dependence of 
growth of GDP in Germany on income distribution. In the same time the autonomous 
component of aggregate demand will be taken into the consideration with 
implications of economic policy on the actual growth. It is based on the implication 
that the wrong aim of the policy on lowering labour costs, having restrictive fiscal 
policy, and tight monetary policy set by ECB, constrains the growth of demand, thus 
negatively impacting growth rate of real GDP. The base for the argument the policy 
focus taken on improving balance on the current account, by moderating wage growth 
and introducing structural reforms in the labour market aimed to increase labour 
market flexibility can be counterproductive for the growth of domestic demand, and, 
thereby, growth of GDP. This is the case as lowering labour costs might help to 
increase employment but only when there is a greater demand for labour, meaning 
during the cyclical booms. On the other hand, during down-turns, the structural 
reforms if followed by tight fiscal and monetary policy can contribute to raising 
unemployment and low growth (Horn in Hein & Truger, ed., 2007:161).  
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2.2.4. The Choice of Empirical Data, Analytical Implications and 
Limitations  
 
The quantitative set of empirical data are obtained from the OECD and the Eurostat 
databases, while they are enriched with qualitative data gathered from OECD 
economic Surveys, and the Economist Intelligence Unit, ECFIN, and IMK working 
papers and reports. As such quantitative dataset represents a standard reference point 
for most of the other studies, though the Eurostat data allow a brief comparison with 
the rest of the euro-area only from the year 1995. This represents, a particular 
limitation for a study that would make a comparative analysis. However, this report is 
focused on explaining Germany’s economic performance and uses the euro-area as a 
reference point for initial observation without investigating the cause of the euro-
area’s growth performance. The qualitative data are consistently interlocked and their 
arguments are reviewed in accordance to the theoretical framework and economic 
indicators.  
 The analysis is conducted by visually matching economic indicators with 
theoretical hypotheses, where correlation coefficients are used to determine whether 
the relation between observed variables is significant. The causal relation is obtained 
on the basis of the theoretical arguments and their consistency with economic 
indicators. This approach, thus, relies frequently on the validity of other studies it 
refers to in order to confirm its conclusions.  
 The greatest drawback of the analysis is that the whole economy of Germany 
is viewed as one economic system, thus not focusing on the regional differences 
between the East and West. The main unemployment problem and structural rigidity 
in the labour market exists mostly in the eastern part of the country. Thus, the 
conclusion of the report should be understood as not diminishing the importance of 
addressing the possible structural impediments in labour supply and quality but 
underlying the need to address demand side constraints. In addition, the impact of 
educational performance, research and development, and foreign direct investments 
(both inward and outward) is not assessed and further investigation needs to be 
conducted. Furthermore, deeper institutional analysis is not conducted so it is not 
possible to determine extent of the path dependency of a particular political decision 
that are reached during the chosen time period, and whether there was possibility to 
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act in time and improve outcomes of particular institutional loops that most probably 
affected the performance of the economy.  
 Thereby, the whole report is aimed to produce an explanation of the economic 
performance of Germany in the period after reunification and not to precisely 
determine the extent of the particular constraints at play.  
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3. Theoretical Framework  
 
This report argues that if an economy is exhibiting persistent unemployment and low 
growth of GDP it is running below full capacity, thereby, it is the question of 
underemployment growth, not equilibrium growth. This section is investigating the 
perspective of underemployment growth from the growth theory perspective. 
This situation is precisely the situation Germany has experienced during last 
two decades. However, many policy recommendations have stressed the structural 
unemployment and low productivity growth as the problem. Such policy focus 
completely ignores a possibility that aggregate demand deficiency can cause 
persistent unemployment, and calls for the supply management policies that can be 
demand restrictive, resulting in imposing a policy constrained growth rate and 
missing a chance to achieve higher sustainable growth rates of employment and GDP. 
On this basis, it is important to investigate whether Germany’s low growth is a 
consequence of structural impediments following reunification, or it is a question of 
underemployment growth, where demand has a significant role. The first possibility 
signifies the problems of too low growth of potential output and supply constraint. 
The second case brings a significant focus on income distribution, balance of 
payments and economic policy, which can result in chronic underemployment.  
 
3.1. Unemployment 
  
If a country exhibits underemployment growth during a prolonged time period, it is 
usually argued to be due to structural impediments. Proponents of such argument cite 
labour market inflexibility, and advocate policy response that should increase 
incentives of people to join the active labour force. However, such argument rests on 
a rather shaky logical ground as it completely ignores the demand influence on 
unemployment.  
From a theoretical perspective there are generally four types of 
unemployment: classical unemployment, natural rate of unemployment, non-
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accelerating inflation rate unemployment (NAIRU), and involuntary unemployment 
in Keynesian sense.  
In the classical view unemployment is a consequence of institutional 
imperfections that create rigidities in wages (Snowdown & Vane, 2005: 38 – 45). 
According to the classical analysis, firms will aim to employ labour until the real 
wage level equals to the marginal product of labour, which would maximize firms’ 
profits. Thereby, the demand for labour is inversely proportionate to the level of real 
wages, while supply of labour depends on workers’ preference for leisure or work. 
The claim is that there is a real wage level equal to the marginal product of labour, 
and if wages were held higher than the market-clearing level, then the unemployment 
would raise. Implication is that wages are considered just as the cost of factor input, 
and too high wages can only have adverse effect on economic growth. Thereby, the 
classical unemployment (Bøye 2006: 365) happens when there is an excess supply of 
labour at the labour market in combination with inflexible wages. Due to assumptions 
of perfect competition and full information the wage rigidity can only be considered 
as a consequence of deficiency at the labour market caused by fixed minimum wage, 
or unfavourable institutional conditions. The role of wages as the determinant of 
domestic demand is simply ignored. The causality solely relies on the productive 
capacity of a country as the determinant of growth of output and employment. As a 
result, the classical unemployment, in absence of wage rigidity is either on a 
voluntary base, as labour is unwilling to work for current wages, or it is frictional in 
character, as labour force is in process of switching between jobs. The cyclical 
characteristic of unemployment is non-existing in the view of classical theory, and the 
policy response should remove any incentives for people to stay outside of labour 
market, as well as provide wage flexibility. 
The extension of the concept of classical unemployment is the natural rate of 
unemployment, and NAIRU. Friedman (1968: 8) argued that there is always some 
level of unemployment that is consistent with equilibrium level of real wage and 
constant inflation, and he dubbed this theoretical concept as the “natural rate of 
unemployment”. Natural unemployment rate is consistent with long-run growth trend, 
and presents such an unemployment rate compatible with the equilibrium real wage. 
In other words, it is a rate of unemployment where supply and demand coincides. Any 
attempt to reduce the unemployment below this natural rate by demand management 
policies would be ineffective, and discretionary monetary policy would result in 
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inflation, as there would be excess demand for labour at the labour market. Slightly 
different concept from natural rate represents NAIRU, which is a minimum 
unemployment rate compatible with stable rate of inflation (Bøye 2006: 365). NAIRU 
incorporates the similar structural characteristics of natural rate of unemployment, but 
it reflects gradual adjustment of economy to a past shocks, it is unemployment rate 
where there is no immediate inflationary pressure (Snowdown & Vane, 2005: 403).  
Despite the difference between the two concepts they can be considered as 
interchangeable (Ball & Mankiw 2002: 134). Both concepts imply that the 
unemployment is structural in character, meaning that it occurs when there is different 
structure in labour supply in relation to the labour market, thus there is a mismatch 
between skills that labour force possesses, and skills needed by companies operating 
within the economy (Bøye 2006: 364). Implication of NAIRU, and the natural 
unemployment rate, is that supply-management policies aimed at improving the 
structure and functioning of the labour market, as well as, structure and functioning of 
industry are considered as the only effective tool in lowering these two types of 
unemployment rate (Snodown & Vane, 2005: 186).   
The previous concepts have highlighted the existence of unemployment as a 
separate function of labour market. However, the concept of involuntary 
unemployment in Keynesian sense represents a connection between goods market and 
labour market. This type of unemployment is caused by deficiency of aggregate 
demand, which makes the production factors redundant (Bøye, 2006: 364). The 
deficiency of aggregate demand signifies the importance of consumption, 
investments, net exports and distribution of income for a general level of 
employment. The involuntary unemployment in Keynesian sense rests on the view 
that demand for labour is determined by the product market (Thirlwall 1997: 9).  
 
3.1.1. The Shadow of Doubt about NAIRU - Hysteresis 
 
In order for unemployment to be attributed to rigidities of a labour market and to be 
characterized mostly as structural in type, natural rate of unemployment, or NAIRU 
should be independent of cyclical unemployment. However, the NAIRU, as well as 
natural rate of unemployment are not immune to cyclical unemployment trend. They 
cannot be solely considered as exogenous variable. When natural rate of 
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unemployment is taken into consideration, it is a rather dubious concept of no 
operational significance, and it can partially serve as the indicator of structural 
impediments.  Two main components determining the natural rate are the level of 
structural unemployment and productivity growth, which both partially depend on the 
strength of aggregate demand (Thirlwall, 1997: 18).   
In a period of slump when cyclical unemployment increases it is not necessary 
that all persons that lost a job will be able to regain it in a period of boom. In a next 
slump, the cyclical unemployment would add to the existing stock of unemployment. 
Thereby, the actual unemployment rate can increase the long-term unemployment, 
and such effect is known as hysteresis (Snodwon &Vane, 2005: 401-405). According 
to duration theories of hysteresis the unemployed suffer a loss of skills due to a time 
they spend outside a labour market and as a consequence it is harder for them to be 
reactivated (Snodwon &Vane, 2005: 406).  
The other perspective on the cause of hystersis are insider-outsider theories 
which emphasize that at the high level of unemployment persons outside the labour 
market find it hard to price their way back to labour market, as only those actively 
employed affect wage formation and can prevent the downward wage adjustments 
(Snodwon &Vane, 2005: 406). However, this type of argument is only applicable in 
the case where skill level is relatively unimportant and costs of labour force are 
determining factor in hiring, which essentially means non-skilled jobs and petty 
service jobs, but if the strength of aggregate demand is high enough, the demand for 
the labour force surges and pricing the way back to labour market would not be a 
problem.  
Thereby, it would be rather unrealistic to consider the structural 
unemployment as completely separated from the cyclical unemployment and ignore 
importance of demand in growth process. The structural policy adjustments make 
sense in the case of the loss of skills, especially as the collapse of East Germany’s 
industry most certainly created a significant mismatch in skills that labour force 
possessed and skills that were demanded on the labour market. However, as the 
increase in unemployment occurred in two large waves, after reunification and after 
2000, the involuntary unemployment in Keynesian sense was probably significant in 
2000. Thus, the lack of demand since 2000 could have a significant impact on growth 
and level of unemployment rather than be a consequence of structural impediments.  
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3.2. Neoclassical Growth Theory Perspective   
 
The structural unemployment argument is mostly compatible with the standard 
interpretation of economic growth through the Solow growth model (Solow, 1956), 
however, Solow’s model is not at all a model built to explain persistent 
unemployment. In essence it is not capable of accounting for any type of 
unemployment, as it is the full employment growth model made to analyze perfectly 
competitive world with perfect information.  
The neoclassical model (Perkins, Radelet and Lindauer, 2006: 117-130; 
Thirlwall 2002: 20-28) uses a production function with diminishing returns to scale 
and perfect substitution between factor inputs to explain the process of economic 
growth. In addition, the potential growth of the economy is assumed to be equal to the 
actual growth, automatically classifying any analysis of economy to the case of full 
employment. Thus the magical formula of economic growth is contained in flowing 
formulation:  
 
[1] Y=F(K,L) ! Y=T K"L1-" or written in the growth rate form  y=t+"k+(1-") l 
 
Y – output; 
T – technology; 
K – capital; 
L – labour; 
" – elasticity of output with respect to capital; 
1- " – elasticity of output with respect to labour; 
y – growth rate of output; 
t – growth rate of total factor productivity (technology); 
k – growth rate of capital; 
l – growth rate of labour; 
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The capital accumulation in per worker term can be expressed as
5
: 
[2]      "Kpw=sq – (l+t)Kpw 
"Kpw – capital accumulation per worker; 
s – propensity to save; 
Making the level of the output in a steady state
6
: 
[3]     q=[(l+t)/s]Kpw 
q – output per worker; 
Kpw – capital per worker; 
 
In the steady state the level of output per worker, or labour productivity, would be the 
positively correlated to the saving rate and negatively correlated to the growth of 
labour force. The growth of output is independent of saving/investment rate, as the 
capital accumulation depends on the growth of labour force and technology. Only in 
the steady state capital per worker and output per worker are constant and the amount 
of new savings (sq) is equal to the amount of new capital needed for growth in 
workforce in efficiency units (l+t).  
In this rather restrictive framework the under employment equilibrium is not 
possible and the only way for long-term unemployment to appear is that there is some 
sort of output gap. This output gap can only be contributed to deficiencies that hinder 
the competitive markets and perfect substitution of labour and capital. In other words, 
the persistence of unemployment can only be explained by the factors not 
encompassed by model, meaning the labour market rigidity, and regulations that 
hinder perfect competition.  
If the assumptions of perfect competition are met, in the case of the faster 
growth of labour force than the growth of capital an economy would move along the 
production function using more capital-intensive production methods, until the 
equilibrium. And opposite would happen if the labour force grows at slower pace than 
                                                
5
 Growth of per worker capital can be expressed as growth rate of capital minus 
growth rate of labour force and technology: "Kpw/Kpw="K/K-"L/L-"T/T ! 
"Kpw/Kpw="K/K-l-t as "K=I, S=I, where S are savings and I investments, and S=sY, 
growth of capital per worker is: "Kpw/Kpw=sY/K-l-t; as Y=qL and K=KpwL then 
"Kpw/Kpw=sq/Kpw-l-t.  
6
 In steady state increase of capital per worker is constant "Kpw=0 therefore sq/Kpw-l-
t=0 ! sq/Kpw=l+t ! sq=(l+t) Kpw 
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capital, where it is assumed that the economies are using more labour-intensive 
methods, as shown in the figure 2.  
If an economy is in transition phase the way to increase employment would be  
by increasing labour productivity, either through increase in total factor productivity, 
or in employing more capital per worker (A. P. Thirlwall 2002: 20-28). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Solow Model Diagram 
(Source: Thirwall, 2002, page 23) 
 
However, if the growth of capital is lower than the growth of labour force, the 
movement to a new steady state can be only hindered by absence of the perfect 
substitution between labour and capital intensive techniques of production. In 
perfectly competitive markets this can happen only if the price of capital-intensive 
technique is lower than labour intensive techniques. Thereby, giving an incentive to 
entrepreneurs to keep capital-intensive modes of production. Increasing the 
propensity to save or lowering labour costs would make an economy reach a new 
growth rate. In addition, perfect substitution between labour and capital intensive 
techniques would require that total factor productivity remains at the same level, 
despite by employing labour intensive techniques the economies of scale can be lost, 
which would negatively affect the TFP.  
Kpw 
(l+t)/s 
q=f(Kpw) 
[(l+t)/s]Kpw 
q 
q
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The problem with this framework is that the policy recommendation is only 
applicable in the case of an economy running close to full employment. In such a case 
competitiveness in international perspective can be gained by lowering labour costs 
compared to labour costs of competitors and consolidating public budget deficit so 
there would be no crowding out of private investments. Substituting the full 
employment assumption with NAIRU cannot make the model more realistic, as 
NAIRU is not immune to demand shocks. Thus, drawing a conclusion on this base 
would disregard the long-term consequences of the demand side shocks. Demand 
shock can be a serious cause of the persistent long-term unemployment and ignoring 
the cyclical unemployment and deficiency of aggregate just runs a risk of increasing 
NAIRU (structural unemployment) and causes the fall of output growth below the 
level of potential output.  
 
3.2.1. Neoclassical Conclusion and Hypothesis 
 
Thereby, according to this model the following conditions have to be present to be 
applicable: 
1) Economy needs to be close to full employment; 
2) There should be perfect substitution between capital and labour; 
3) The economy needs to function as close to perfect competition as possible; 
 
The source of long-term unemployment and output gap has to fall onto one of these 
conditions not being fulfilled. Meaning the inflexibility in labour market that restricts 
perfect substitution between labour and capital and creates voluntary unemployment, 
or low gains in productivity compared to competitors, making overall labour costs too 
high.  
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3.3. Demand Constrains to Growth 
 
The argument from the previous section is hardly applicable to the economy that is 
exhibiting underemployment through a prolonged time period. The analytical problem 
at hand is exactly what in Solow’s model is taken for granted, the adjustment process. 
Thus, distinction should be made between the full capacity growth rate (potential 
growth rate) and actual rate of growth.  
In this instance Harrod’s model represents a useful tool for gaining insight into 
the underemployment growth during a prolonged time periods. Its knife-edge 
instability, as Joan Robinson dubbed it, signifies the problem of divergence between 
different growth rates. Harrod introduced three growth rates: actual, warranted and 
natural growth rate. The potential, or “natural” growth rate, is determined by 
technological advancements, which can be measured by an increase in labour 
productivity, and growth of work force (Harrod, 1939: 30).  
[4]     gn=l+t 
gn – natural growth rate; 
l – growth rate of labour force; 
t – growth rate of labour productivity; 
 
The warranted growth rate is the growth rate that keeps savings equal to planned 
investments, or the rate of growth in demand, at which capital is fully employed, with 
no excess or shortfall in investments:  
“The warranted rate of growth is taken to be that rate of growth which, if it occurs, 
will leave all parties satisfied [producers and investors] that they have produced 
neither more nor less than the right amount.” (Harrod, 1939:  16) 
 
[5]   gw=s/Cr=(S/Y)/(Ip/"Yp) and ga=s/Cp=(S/Y)/(I/"Y) 
gw – warranted growth rate; 
s – propensity to save; 
Ip – planned investments; 
Cr – required incremental capital to output ratio; 
ga – actual growth rate; 
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Cp – incremental capital to output ratio which occurs in specific period of time 
I – investments; 
"Yp – increase of output that would fully utilize capital; 
  
Only if all three growth rates coincide, there is a full employment growth and full 
capital utilization, however, Harrod argues that the actual growth rate influences the 
warranted growth rate: “As actual growth departs upwards or downwards from the 
warranted level, the warranted rate itself moves, and may chase the actual rate in 
either direction.” (Harrod, 1939: 29-30). If the warranted and natural growth rate are 
not at the same level, an attempt to influence the warranted rate by restraining demand 
and increasing productive capacity would bring divergence between actual and 
warranted growth, either in a sense that chronic unemployment would occur as as 
there is a try to increase it: 
“[…] higher propensity to save does, in fact, warrant a higher rate of growth. Trouble 
arises if the rate of growth which it warrants is greater than that which the increase of 
population and the increase of technical capacity render permanently possible. And the 
fundamental paradox is that the more ambitious the rate warranted is, the greater the 
probability that the actual output will from time to time, and even persistently fall 
below that which the productive capacity of the population would allow.” (Harrod 
1939: 31)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At this point it is important to draw attention of a reader to this report’s 
interpretation of three growth rates introduced in Harrod’s model: 
 
! The natural rate of growth is the growth rate that guarantees the full 
employment of labour force given the level of technology. 
 
! The warranted growth rate is the rate of growth that guarantees the 
full utilization of capital in the economy. 
 
! The actual rate of growth is the rate of growth depending on the level 
of aggregate demand. 
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If the warranted growth rate exceeds the actual growth rate, the aggregate 
demand is below the level needed to fully utilize capital, and capital accumulation 
would further decrease as the entrepreneurs would have incentive to invest less, 
meaning that the investments would have tendency to slowdown due to lack of 
demand. In the opposite case, when the actual rate is above warranted, the aggregate 
demand is above the level of growth in real capital capacity, and entrepreneurs would 
have incentive to invest more (Harrod 1939: 22). This brings the role of ex-ante 
investments that are not necessarily equal to ex-post investments, meaning that on 
balance ex-post investment and ex-post savings will always be equal, however, the 
uncertainty in the model arises from a notion that ex-ante investments are not always 
equal to ex-post savings. Hereby, the role of uncertainty in the model is extremely 
important as the principle of instability which Harrod signified depends upon the 
divergence of plans to invest and investments that actually occur, with a result that 
actual and warranted growth rates wouldn’t automatically coincide.  
If the warranted rate is above the level of natural growth rate, capital 
accumulation is higher than the growth of workforce, giving a possibility to absorbed 
previously unemployed labour. In this case the actual growth rate, which is driven by 
aggregate demand is important, as if demand is high and there has been previously a 
high level of unemployment, as the excess labour force would be absorbed by 
increased demand from a labour market.  
However, the actual growth rate can be above natural growth rate only for a 
limited period of time as the economy starts overheating: “If the warranted rate is 
above the natural rate, the actual rate must be below the warranted rate for most of 
the time, and the centrifugal forces pull it further down, causing frequent periods of 
unemployment.” (Harrod 1959: 455). In this case the inflation would turn cyclical 
boom into the slump as the demand lowers, thus there would be tendency to lower the 
investments and thereby actual growth rate would start falling making unemployment 
frequent. 
In the case when warranted rate is below natural growth rate, meaning that the 
capital accumulation is expanding slower than effective labour force, unemployment 
of structural character would be persistent (Thriwall, 2002: 15-16). Cyclical boom is 
brought by divergence of actual growth from warranted growth rate where the 
absolute ceiling set by the natural growth rate, when this limit is reached the boom 
stops and reverses most likely into a slump. In a case where the natural rate of growth 
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is above warranted then unemployment of structural character is present, and in the 
same time there would be inflationary pressure as an economy would be able to grow 
at the higher rate but the capital accumulation would be lower than workforce growth. 
Thereby, simultaneous coexistence of unemployment and inflation would appear. 
In order to avoid long-term unemployment the warranted growth rate needs to 
be close to the natural. However, the warranted rate itself is dependent on the 
movement of the actual growth rate, meaning that it is subjected to the demand 
factors. In Harrodian view when an economy is growing fast it continues to grow 
faster beyond the full employment, by fuelling wage inflation or bubbles to appear, 
but when the growth is slow it continues even at slower pace bringing high 
unemployment.  
The Harrodian view would suppose that during the reunification the natural 
growth was above warranted, but as demand surged inflation appeared (as east 
German mark suddenly became overvalued), followed by a loss of competitiveness in 
the export based sector due to high production costs. Afterwards, the problem became 
reversed as the capital accumulation accelerated but bypassed eastern part of the 
country, and as there was fiscal and monetary tightening followed. West Germany 
probably exhibited growth close to the level of the natural growth rate and expansion 
of capital was high. In the aftermath of reunification the capital stock excessively 
depleted due to increased demand and system went into the slump, with the result of 
the eastern industry collapse. In later period the supply oriented approach dictated 
slower wage growth and increased focus on export sector. 
In Harrodian perspective if the corrective policies target savings the result can 
be unfavourable for growth. To demonstrate such case the accounting identity can be 
recalled, to simplify the case government sector will be ignored and the output can be 
formulated as the sum of consumption and investments: 
[6]     Y=C+I 
C -  consumption; 
 
By stating that savings represent a decision of not consuming we can formulate 
consumption as equal to the output less savings, by substituting saving identity with 
propensity to save, the following formulation is obtained: 
[7]     C=Y-S  
[8]      S=sY  
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[9]     C=Y-sY=(1-s)Y 
 
S – savings; 
Returning the formulation into equation [18] we obtain: 
[10]     Y=(1-s)Y + I=I/s 
 
As the multiplier is 1/s the increment of output can be written as a function of the 
increment of investments times multiplier: 
[11]     "Y="I/s 
"Y – increment of output; 
"I – increment of investments; 
 
Thereby, in the actual growth rate the higher multiplier requires lower propensity to 
save. Which is a tribute to Keynesian idea that increased savings are generally having 
adverse impact on increase of output. The difference between neoclassical perspective 
and Keynesian perspective is that in the Keynesian view investments are the driver of 
growth (Stockhammer, 1999: 8), and investments are determined independently from 
savings. Investments may be constrained by non-availability of credit rather than the 
supply of savings. Thus the involuntary unemployment in Keynsian sense creates 
structural unemployment as the actual rate is leading warranted and determines 
whether warranted will be at the level of natural output or below. This is Keynsian 
perspective of the story stating that the reason for investments to be down is 
deficiency of aggregate demand. 
The warranted and actual growth rate coincide when growth of investments is 
such to absorb all the savings rate of the economy: 
[12]     "Y/Y=i/c=(I/Y)/c ! "Y=I/c 
[13]     I/c="I/s ! "I/I=s/c 
 
As savings are not automatically translated into investments, any try to increase 
savings would affect the system to lower the actual growth, and thereby, probably 
decrease investments in the future, since the demand would lower. Thus, instead of 
increasing warranted rate, increase in propensity to save would drag both warranted 
and actual growth rates to drop down. This would as well apply in a situation where 
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warranted rate is below natural, making system unable to expand through 
manipulation of savings. The causality is that savings adjust to investments, in a sense 
opposite of Say’s law, meaning that demand governs supply. The argument for such 
interpretation is that savings are not necessarily transferred on products produced by 
labour (Davidson in Snowdown & Vane, 2005: 458), in other words the existence of 
non-reproducible goods makes savings relatively bad target for increase in output, 
either in the short or long time period. Thereby, warranted rate is such rate of growth 
where investment growth is sufficient to absorb the rate of savings in the economy, 
with regards to the capital to output ratio.  
 
3.3.1 Investments and Wages 
 
When domestic demand is taken into the consideration, there exists a delicate balance 
between investments and wages and economic growth. Wages are an essential 
component of private consumption and have positive effect on growth as long as they 
are in line with productivity growth. Despite the raise of wages increased cost of 
labour input, business will be willing to invest as long as investments are profitable, 
and with the private sector investments comes growth.   
 This relation between wages, investments and growth represents the argument 
of the models built on Kaleckian framework of income distribution. The main 
assumption in these models is that the labour demand curve has a positive relation to 
real wages, meaning that an increase of wages can stimulate aggregate demand, and 
vice verse (Lavoie 2006: 86-95). Despite the decrease of wages lowers the costs of 
production, and increases profit all firm, at the aggregate level lower wages would 
have a negative effect, as consumption would lower. Thus, wages have a twofold role, 
they are cost of production input, but they are also the essential component of 
domestic demand. If the domestic demand does not represent a strong component of 
aggregate demand, a wage increase might result in lower profits, and decreased 
demand for exports due to higher cost of production (Ederer & Stockhammer in Hein 
& Truger ed.,2007: 119-120).  
The role of income distribution can be shown through the short run Kaleckian 
framework. This is the Cambridge version of growth explaining the principle by 
which investments are self-financed and independent of the propensity to save, and 
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depending on increase in profits or capacity utilization (Bhaduri in Marcuzzo, Pasnetti 
& Roncaglia ed., 1996: 200 - 205). If it is assumed that workers spend what they earn 
and capitalist save a portion of income the formulation is as follows:   
[14]     Y=P+W=CW+CC+I 
[15]     CW=W 
[16]     P=CC+I 
P – profits; 
W – wages; 
CC – consumption of capitalists; 
CW – consumption of workers;  
 
As capitalist allocate a portion of income partly to investments and partly to 
consumption out of profits, following can be written: 
[17]     CC+I=(1-s)P + sP 
 
If it is assumed that a portion of income that goes to capitalist consumption is 
insignificant profit equitation yields:  
[18]     CC=0 
[19]     sP=I 
[20]     P=I/s 
 
The standard condition for equilibrium is that:  
[20]     I=S=sP  
If the investment function is specified as follows  
[21]    I=s (P/Ya) (Ya/Yp) Yp  
P – profits; 
And potential output is assumed to be equal to 1 then the investments take form of:  
[22]     I= s # u 
# – profit share; 
u – degree of capacity utilization; 
 
The growth rate of capital accumulation is found by dividing equitation [21] with 
capital stock.  
[23]   gc=I/K= s (P/Ya) (Ya/Yp) (Yp/K) = s # u v  
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v – ratio of full capacity to book value of capital; 
 
An increase in a profit has twofold effect, on one hand it can stimulate growth if 
profits are reinvested, but on the other hand if it is targeted at non-reproducible goods 
the effect is opposite on growth. Previously shown variation of Kaleckian approach 
would signify that the larger the profit share the greater would be the growth, and it is 
not clear in which way profit expansion is twofold.  
Using new Kaleckian growth models (Lavoie, 2006: 108-132) it can be shown 
a twofold effect of profits. If the profit from equitation [19] is normalized with capital 
stock to obtain a dynamic version of profit equitation, the following is obtained:  
[24]    P/K=(I/K)/s = (P/Ya)(Ya/Yp)(Yp/K)  
 
At which point the standard Cambridge profit equitation is obtained: 
[25]     r= gc / s= # u/v 
r – rate of profit  
 
However, the investment function and saving function are independently 
determined as two different classes are behind the investment and saving decision. A 
part of investments depends on the expected sales, while a part depends on the 
difference between normal level of capacity utilization and one that actually occurs. If 
the actual rate of capacity utilization is less than normal, firms would believe that they 
have excess capacity as investment are falling short of investment level excepted by 
sales. Such interpretation incorporates the fluctuation of demand as determinant of 
investments and goes hand in hand with post-Keynesian microeconomic foundations 
by which it is assumed that firms operate below full capacity utilization, thereby, 
allowing supply to adjust the demand. Most firms operate between 70 and 85 percent 
of capacity (Lavoie, 2006: 41). Thereby, the investment function depends on the 
planned investment component and component depending on the current demand 
conditions. Savings are the same as in standard Cambridge interpretation: 
[26]     g i=a + b ( u –  un) 
[27]     gs=s r 
a – level of autonomous expenditures; 
b – level of expenditures depending on the capacity utilization; 
u – actual capacity utilization level; 
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un – normal level of capacity utilization; 
 
The rate of profit depending on the effective demand conditions: 
[28]     r
ed
=(a + b u – b un)/s 
r
ed
 – effective demand rate of profit; 
 
From accounting perspective the rate of profit from equitation [25] represents profit 
rate seen from a cost side:  
[29]     r
pc
= # u/v  
r
pc
 – profit rate seen from cost side; 
 
For equilibrium it is needed that these two profit rates coincide, and thereby, it is 
possible to derive to an equilibrium rate of capacity utilization:  
[30]     (s # u)/v = a + b u – b un 
[31]     s # u =a v + b v u – b v un 
[32]     s # u – b v u=a v – b v un 
[33]     u (s # – b v) = v (a – b un) 
[34]     u
*
=(a – b un)/(s # /v – b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Effect of the Increase in Capacity Utilization  
(Source: Lavoie 2006, page 118) 
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There are two effects of new Kaleckian models. Firstly, the fall in propensity to save 
would cause an effective demand to be higher than expected leading to higher level of 
capacity utilization, and thereby, the higher growth rate. This effect is known as 
paradox of Thrift. Secondly, the increase in profit rate can increase investments but in 
the same time it has an effect on lowering level of capacity utilization leading to 
lower rates of accumulation. For a single firm if the real wages increase, it will lead to 
a lower profit, however, if most firms do the same, the aggregate profits would 
increase in the future, as there will be higher level of capacity utilization economy 
wide. This effect is known as paradox of costs. Thus an effective demand is the main 
leader of growth leading to a proposition that a growth can be wage-led. Increase in 
profit share generally lowers the rate of capital accumulation, and the same happens 
with the increase of propensity to save.  
 
3.3.2. Implications of Kaleckian Framework and Its Hypothesis 
 
According to the Kaleckian framework demand, especially the level of wages, which 
determines the consumption, is important determinant of capital accumulation and 
growth. This framework encapsulates the wage led economic growth and wages 
determine the level of investments, as long as raise in wages is not fuelling inflation 
as it surpasses productivity growth. Thus, despite the profit share would decrease the 
overall aggregate profits would rise.   
On the basis of this it is possible to argue that Germany suffers from the lack 
of investments due to highly capital-intensive economy; investments are constrained 
by the too low consumption originating from low wage growth that is translated into 
the low capacity utilization.  
 
3.3.3 Consumption and Exports 
 
Balance of payments constraint theory can be used as a useful tool to signify the 
policy trade offs in attempt to improve growth rate by trying to pursue export led 
growth. Theoretical argument (Thirwall 2002: 66 – 78) rests on the proposition that in 
a long run country cannot grow faster than it is consistent with balance of payments 
equilibrium unless it can finance the ever-growing deficit on the current account.  
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The balance on the current account is linked to the country’s competitiveness. The 
international competitiveness can be defined in one of the two manners (Blecker in 
McCombie & Thirlwall ed. 2004: 85): 
1) Ability of the country to balance its trade through the relative price 
adjustments, meaning the adjustments of exchange rate and real wages. 
2) Ability of the country to maintain surplus on the current account by avoiding 
reduction in income or employment, this definition departs from the balance 
of payments constraint view. 
 
The second definition is the primary concern of this report, as it connects the situation 
on the current account to the national income and employment, while the first 
definition is important in regards to the policies that are already implemented. These 
concepts are extremely important in order to capture whether it is possible that the 
low growth and persistent unemployment steam from policy focus to maintain surplus 
on the current account. In a sense what is to be investigated is whether or not there is 
a serious trade off between maintaining surplus on the current account and growth of 
income and employment in Germany’s case. 
Thus, it is relevant to understand that there exists a trade off between 
maintaining the surplus on the current account, employment and income by keeping 
in mind whether the economic growth of the country is primarily consumption based 
of profit based. In a sense the export-based growth is mostly consisted with 
economies that are profit led, however the wage led economies can be severely 
constrained if the policy focus is to maintain surplus on the current account. The 
effect of policy on the growth of income and employment can be severe especially if 
the country faces competitiveness problems in the sense of simultaneously 
maintaining the balance of trade surplus and avoiding the chronic unemployment and 
lower growth rate. 
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3.3.4. Effect of Demand Restrictive Policy 
 
The point of maintaining surplus in the current account is to avoids policy constraint, 
as the surplus on the current account is equal to the change in net foreign assets it has 
a positive effect on international investment position (balance of indebtness). Thus, by 
generating current account surplus a particular country can be independent from 
foreign creditors, and be positioned as an international creditor. In other words, the 
country is sovereign in economic sense.  
In order to generate surplus on the current account, a country has to generate 
positive net exports since balance of trade is largest component of the current account. 
Exports are partially endogenous part of aggregate demand because they mostly 
depend on the level of foreign demand and the competitiveness of home country’s 
industry. Imports represent the foreign supply of good and services that cannot be 
matched by domestic production and, thereby, depend on the size of domestic 
production and level of consumption. In the case of fixed exchange rate regime it is 
not possible to improve balance of trade by devaluation. The exports can be increased 
when the price and quality of export goods is improved, but also the trading partner 
countries need to exhibit higher demand for such goods. While reducing consumption 
by demand restricting policy can restrict the imports. Thereby, if a country restricts 
the wage growth it should improve productivity in export based industry, as the 
production price would be lowered, and in the same time it would create the lower 
demand for consumption goods as the purchasing power of wage earners is restricted.  
However, demand-restricting approach disregards the effect of wage growth 
for the size of domestic product. Wages are essential component of consumption, and 
if the domestic demand represents important contribution to overall, growth wage 
restricting policy results in lower growth of GDP and employment. Thereby, a 
country that restricts its domestic demand in order to generate surplus on the current 
account might not improve its competitiveness. This represents a cyclical problem of 
international transactions that Nicholas Kaldor (1950: 44) pointed out, where at the 
given exchange rate the fall in income and employment tends to reduce country’s 
 43 
imports and generate surplus on the current account of balance of payments. Despite 
this is politically desirable situation the policy trade off is severe.  
The second problem in restricting demand through the wage restriction is that 
it affects the whole economy by lowering demand for import goods and non-tradable 
goods. Furthermore, this can negatively affect economies of scale in manufacturing 
industries that target just domestic market, as well as ones targeting both domestic 
and foreign market under unchanged foreign demand. Such effect is plausible 
especially if the export industry is specialized in high value added products that are 
quality competitive. 
Thus it is possible to present the effect of wage restricting policy through 
static framework, where the demand depending components of the national account 
are consumption expenditures, investments and exports, while the supply is 
determined by the size of domestic production (GDP) and what has been imported. 
Exports largely depend on the level of income abroad, composition of foreign demand 
for the products of that type and competitiveness of domestic export industry on 
international market. Imports depend on the level of income in a home country, which 
is not matched by domestic supply, and competitiveness of domestic industry in 
goods competing with foreign produced goods.  
[35]    X=xYF 
[36]    M=M+mY 
[37]    AS=Y+M 
[38]    AD=C+I+X 
[39]    T=E-M 
[40]    AS=AD 
AS – aggregate supply; 
AD – aggregate demand; 
X – exports; 
M – imports; 
m – propensity to import; 
x – propensity to export; 
T – balance of trade; 
Y – GDP; 
YF – income abroad; 
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The figure 4 represents the effect of both demand restricting policy and the effect 
improvement of competitiveness in static view. This situation is purely in the case of 
fixed exchange rate. When a demand restricting policy is set it affects both aggregate 
supply and aggregate demand curves. The aggregate supply curve rotates downwards 
due to lower propensity to import brought by lower wages (AS1), and the overall level 
of aggregate demand lowers due to lower consumption (AD1). The effect is that the 
overall level of income is lowered but the balance of trade swings into surplus.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The Effect of Supply and Demand on Balance of Trade  
(Source: Jespersen, 2005, page 97) 
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To improve balance of trade and increase the output a country’s net-exports needs to 
increase. The increase of aggregate demand can occur either by increased exports as 
foreign demand increases or, by increase in domestic consumption followed by lower 
propensity to import, at the unchanged or improved level of exports. In absence of 
trade barriers the only effective way to lower propensity to import is by increasing 
competitiveness of domestic industry competing with imports. However, if the initial 
problem is not lack of competitiveness of domestic industry but that the general level 
of domestic demand is too low, then an increase in wages would generate increase in 
consumption and stimulus to the investments at home shifting the aggregate demand 
curve up (AD2), while in the same time lowering of propensity to import occurs as the 
static economies of scale kick off in sectors competing with importers (AS2). This 
represents the way in which wage led growth can result in improved balance of trade 
and increased employment, by manipulating only components of domestic demand. 
The draw back is that with the increased wages the export industries can suffer a loss 
of price competitiveness, however as long the price elasticity of demand for export is 
not high, which is the case in most high value added manufacturing products, the 
exports can remain at the same level. Thus, if the domestic consumption stimulates 
the production of domestic goods and services and, thereby, lowering propensity to 
imports more than export sector is affected by a loss of price competitiveness, the 
effect on growth rate of whole economy is positive. This is only the case if the 
country’s growth is mostly wage led and if the domestic industry is able to compete 
with importing industries.  
There are two arguments why the increase in labour costs wouldn’t negatively 
affect the competitiveness of export industries. Firstly, Germany’s manufacturing 
exports are very capital intensive, so increase in domestic wages that is in line with 
productivity gains would not have a decisive impact on price formation. Secondly, 
with increased sales at home, companies’ profits increase as well, so as long as wage 
growth is in line with productivity growth and static economies of scale are at work 
(Thirwall 2002: 87), prices do not need to rise.  
Such assumption is plausible when having in mind two generic types of the 
strategy by which a company can respond to the industry‘s structure, and achieve 
sustainable competitive advantage within such an industry. These generic strategies: 
lower cost and differentiation (Porter, 1990: 37 - ff.). Lower cost strategy is the ability 
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of the company to design and create comparable products more efficiently than 
competitors, resulting in products that are cheaper to produce than products of 
competitors. Differentiation strategy is the ability of company to produce unique and 
superior product compared to competitors, either in terms of quality, special features 
or after-sale service, resulting in greater value to the customers. Both strategies result 
in competitive advantage, where lower-cost company produces given output by usage 
of less input than competitors require, while differentiated company has higher 
revenue per unit than competitors. Germany’s export products are high value added 
and in automobile industry their price is higher compared to Asian products. In this 
instance it can be argued that Germany’s companies have obtained competitive 
advantage based on diversification strategy, where price elasticity of demand is not 
high.   
In the case of Germany the balance of payment constraint, if present, is not 
imposed by lack of competitiveness in international perspective, but due to policy 
focus to bring current account surplus through restricting wage growth. In the 
simplest form, the dynamic version of the balance of payments constraint can be 
shown as the ratio of growth of exports and price elasticity of demand for imports 
(Thirlwall, 2002: 71): 
[41]     gBoP=x/ $ 
gBoP – growth rate consistent with balance of payments constraint; 
x – growth rate of exports; 
$ - price elasticity of demand for imports; 
 
If the country’s growth rate runs close or slightly above equilibrium rate on 
balance of payments and there exists unemployment, then a country is balance of 
payments constrained. The balance of payments growth rate can be raised through the 
growth of exports, which can be done by improvement in real terms of trade, or by 
currency depreciation, but in the second case only temporary. The only permanent 
way to increase the balance of payments growth rate is by specializing in high value 
added goods with focus on quality, technical sophistication and marketing rather than 
on price (Thirwall, 2002: 77). In order for such line of argument to be feasible the 
lower income and low consumption should be accompanied by the higher price 
elasticity of demand for imports.  
 47 
As the global economy is interconnected and industries are outsourced the 
export component is partially linked to the development of domestic demand. If for 
instance the industry outsourced a part of manufacturing process abroad while the 
final assembly remains domestically based, and products are demanded on domestic 
as well as on foreign markets then the increase in domestic demand generates increase 
in both exports and imports. However, as income raises the import elasticity of 
demand should decrease.  
Germany’s growth suffered in aftermath of reunification, whereby price 
competitiveness deteriorated significantly leading to trade deficit, the ECFIN’s report 
claims that: 
“Germany's cost and price competitiveness started recovering from 1995 onwards, 
with increases in nominal compensation per employee only slightly above or even 
below productivity gains. By 2000, Germany's real exchange rate had dropped back to 
its 1991 level. As a result, German export performance was in line with the expansion 
of foreign markets over 1996-2000 and the contribution of net exports to real GDP 
growth turned positive again.” (ECFIN, 2007a :16) 
 
The ECFIN’s conclusion rests on first definition of competitiveness that focuses on 
relative price adjustments either through exchange rate or real wage adjustments that 
should lower trade deficit or turn it into surplus. However, the loss of price 
competitiveness should be connected to the collapse of East Germany’s industry and 
increase in consumption that caused trade deficit. 
On this basis it can be argued that Germany has experienced a period of being 
balance of payments constrained until 2000. However one view on the 
competitiveness is that the country remains uncompetitive if it needs to reduce its 
income and employment in order to avoid trade deficit (Blecker in McCombie & 
Thirlwall ed. 2004: 85).  Here the causality is reverse from neoclassical as relative 
income adjusts to the balance of trade at a given relative prices. In the case where 
country tries to improve trade balance, depending on the composition of domestic 
demand there can be significant trade off. Especially if private consumption 
constitutes important determinant of domestic demand and affects overall growth rate 
more than external component of demand, net-exports. In such a situation if a country 
tries to improve its international competitiveness by wage moderation, but aggregate 
demand remains constrained, as growth of net-exports is not sufficient, to compensate 
for lack of domestic demand caused by decrease in private consumption the result in 
raise of unemployment. When a growth of a country largely depends on private 
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consumption, due to a large domestic market the currency depreciation is more 
effective in regaining international competitiveness. However, such policy is easily 
offset by other countries depreciating their currency, and might work only for a short 
while. Essentially, the only secure way to improve international competitiveness is to 
engage into industrial policy that can change import elasticity, by targeting import 
competing sectors.    
 Such implication is also confirmed by Robert Blecker (McCombie & 
Thirlwall ed. 2004: 85-107) who claims that there is a policy trade off between 
lowering real wages, or depreciating currency and increasing unemployment when a 
country wishes to maintain trade balance. Blecker’s conclusion is based on the 
external balance condition which is relating the relative wage growth in a home 
country compared to the wage growth abroad, and domestic growth rate of output, for 
which trade balance can be maintained in a long-run, at a given growth rate of income 
abroad. This condition is formulated as follows (Blecker in McCombie & Thirlwall 
ed. 2004: 88)
7
: 
[42]   #=(q-q*)+{($xy
*
-$my)/[(%x+%m-1)(1-&-&
*
)]} 
# – relative wage change in a home country compared to the wage change abroad for 
which trade balance is maintained in the long run, given the growth rate of income 
abroad; 
q – growth rate of productivity in a home country; 
q
*
 – growth rate of productivity abroad; 
$x – income elasticity for exports; 
$m – income elasticity for imports; 
y – growth of real output in a home country; 
y
*
 – growth of real output abroad; 
%x – price elasticity for export; 
%m – price elasticity for imports; 
-& – elasticity of markup factor of a home country with respect to the relative wage 
change between a home country and aboard; 
&* – elasticity of markup factor abroad with respect to the relative wage change 
between a home country and abroad; 
                                                
7
 Blecker adopts the hypothesis of markup pricing and assumed that a markup rate is 
reduced when production in a home country becomes more costly relative to 
production abroad.  
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Figure 5: The Balance of Payments Constraint and Relative Wage Changes  
(Source: McCombie & Thirwall, 2004, page 88) 
 
 
The figure 5 represents Blecker’s argument concerning the trade off between lowering 
the wages and maintaining the trade balance by holding in regard the composition of 
aggregate demand. According to Blecker (McCombie & Thirlwall ed. 2004: 88-89) 
the balance of trade is represented by downward slopping line T=0, the points below 
and to the left are areas of trade surplus, and points to the right and above the line are 
points representing trade deficit. On vertical axis is the relative rate of wage increase 
in a home country with respect to wage change abroad; while on horizontal axis is the 
growth rate of output. The balance of payments constrained growth rate (yB) is 
assumed to be below the natural growth rate represented by the line y=n. When the 
change of relative wages is in accordance to the difference between productivity 
growth in a home country and abroad, the real effective exchange rate is constant.  
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This is represented with the line !p=q-q
*
. In such case the economy has to grow at the 
balance of payments constrained rate.
8
 This is represented at the point B where 
relative wage growth in a home country with respect to the wage growth abroad is at 
balance of payments constrained growth rate. The point F represents the full 
employment growth rate of output with trade balance being in equilibrium. While the 
line !f represents relative wage growth in a home country with respect to the wage 
growth abroad is at the level that secures a full employment and trade balance to be in 
equilibrium. The aggregate demand is introduced into the picture by curves AD1 and 
AD2. The first curve (AD1) represents the case of stagnationism, or that the growth of 
demand is wage led, meaning that the composition of aggregate demand is more 
dependent on the private consumption than on net-exports. The second curve (AD2) is 
the case of exhilarationism, where the economy is expansionary and profit led, 
meaning that contribution of net-exports is more significant for the growth of 
aggregate demand than contribution from private consumption.   
In the case of stagnationism the decrease in real wages would represent the 
movement of the growth and wages along AD1 curve, leading to the lower growth rate 
and movement of the economy away from full employment point. The trade balance 
would improve but as the consequence of the contraction in growth rate. In the 
opposite case the neoclassical approach would result in rising employment, as the 
economy would move toward the full employment, price elasticity of demand for 
imports is lower than price elasticity of demand for imports.  
 
3.3.5. Policy Constrained Hypothesis 
 
On the basis of previous line of arguments it is possible that as Germany represents 
the wage led economy it experienced rising unemployment and lower growth rate, 
due to policy caused slowdown of domestic consumption and increased demand for 
imported products. The demand constraint, thereby, comes from increased 
consumption in the aftermath of reunification and following the collapse of East 
                                                
8
 In order for the external balance condition to be fulfilled #=#p, thus:  
(q-q
*
)=(q-q
*
)+{($xy
*
-$my)/[(%x+%m-1)(1-&-&
*
)]}!  
0=($xy
*
-$my)/[(%x+%m-1)(1-&-&
*
)]! 
0=($xy
*
-$my) !  
y=($xy
*
)/$m which is exactly the balance of payments constrained growth yB. 
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Germany’s industry, as unemployment surged the lower demand for domestic 
products and translated itself to balance of trade deficit. Thus, it is possible to argue 
that Germany is pursuing a balance of payments surplus policy at the cost of 
persistent unemployment, as the effect of wage restricting policy and structural 
reforms constrains domestic demand.  
4. Analysis 
 
This section of the report will firstly introduce the overview of the labour market 
reforms that were conducted in Germany since reunification together with reference 
to the unemployment rate, and afterwards it will proceed with reviewing both supply 
side and demand side arguments.  
 The aim of the analysis is not to derive a precise answer on the influence of 
demand side variables but rather to match implications of the theoretical framework 
with development of economic indicators. The correlation between given variables is 
obtained through the correlation coefficients while the causal mechanism derives 
from the theoretical framework.  
 Prior the review of the demand side arguments the neoclassical approach is 
discussed in order to assess its relevance for the whole time period. The supply side 
argument calling for structural reforms is based on the Solow growth model 
introduced in the theoretical section. In addition, aspects of the neoclassical 
theoretical base that serve as the basis of the Solow model are discussed in order to 
assess explanatory potential of the approach in the case of Germany, and afterwards 
the reference to the development of economic indicators is done.  
 Conduct of economic policy and policy response is based on the discussion 
concerning the fiscal policy effectiveness. The connection between fiscal and 
monetary policy is taken in regard but no independent assessment of monetary policy 
conduct is done as monetary policy is under ECB’s discretion.  The credit view of the 
money is used only to explain in which situation fiscal policy can be effective in 
stimulating growth and employment. Insights of New-Keynesian arguments 
concerning the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus during the slump are used, since they 
are considered to be complementary with general theoretical framework that departs 
from the Post- Keynesian approach.  
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4.1. Labour Market and Unemployment 
 
Since reunification the unemployment situation in Germany as whole deteriorated 
significantly with unemployment rate steadily increasing from 6.27 percent in 1991 to 
9.25 percent in 1997. From 1997 unemployment rate started decreasing to 7.4 percent 
in 1999, and then surging again in the aftermath of global economic slowdown to 
10.53 percent in 2004, and then gearing down to 7.35 percent in 2007. The East 
German economy was worst hit by the bulk of unemployment where unemployment 
level increased from 10 percent in 1991 to 20 percent in 2004 (Wunsch, 2005: 3). 
 Prior to reunification the East German economy had an industry structure in 
favour of manufacturing and agriculture with an outdated production technology, with 
the manufacturing sector being highly dependant on exports to the rest of eastern 
block countries. More than half German Democratic Republic’s (GDR) industry 
equipment was older than one decade, while agriculture, forestry, energy, mining and 
manufacturing accounted for roughly 47 percent of employment compared to 37 
percent in the West Germany (Wunsch. 2005: 5-6). 
 The situation prior reunification was that in the GDR unemployment level was 
close to nil, and labour force was roughly around 10 million, while Western Germany 
had unemployment level of close to 8 percent and labour force of roughly 28 million 
(Wunsch. 2005: 5). After reunification the Deutschmark was introduced in the GDR 
and all trade and labour movement barriers were removed, but as the contractual 
wages were converted at pair into Deutschmark. The East Germans began substituting 
eastern products with western on a massive scale and the industrial output in the East 
declined sharply. In addition, due to sudden increase in production costs the export 
prices effectively tripled and exports to eastern block countries sharply declined. In 
the aftermath registered unemployment surged to more than 10 per cent in 1991. On 
the other hand, according to Wunsch (2005: 5-6) in Western Germany due to 
increased demand for its goods in the Eastern Germany, GDP grew by more than 5 
percent between 1990 and 1992 while unemployment fell to 6.2 percent in 1991. 
However, the world recession of 1990 began depressing export share in West 
Germany and in 1992 growth significantly slowed down and unemployment in West 
Germany rose to 8 percent in 1993 (Wunsch, 2005: 6).  
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 According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, after reunification, in the East 
Germany number of unemployed reached 1.2m, or 14.6 percent as unemployment 
rate, while a significant number of employed persons were on job-creation schemes. 
The West Germany prior the reunification had an excellent training system and 
unemployment rate among lowest in the EU, even in the immediate aftermath of 
reunification unemployment remained below the EU average despite migration from 
the East Germany. However, after 1992 the surplus labour made a problem in parts of 
western Germany. German statistics reported rise of unemployment from 5.5 percent 
in 1991 to 10.4 percent in 1998, which initially resulted from cyclical downturn but 
increasingly became structural in character (EIU, 1999-2000: 18-19). 
 According to Wunsch (2005: 7-8) in the second half of 1990s, German economy 
as whole was suffering slowdown, whereas is the East Germany growth significantly 
slowed down due to shrinking of construction industry accompanied by public 
expenditures cuts resulting in unemployment rate of 19 percent in 1998. However, the 
growth in West Germany recovered by 2000 reducing unemployment from 11 to 8 
percent, but following the world economy slowdown in 2001 the unemployment in 
the west increased to 9.8 percent, while in the east the whole recovery of late 1990s 
was short lived and unemployment peaked to 20 percent in 2003 (Wunsch, 2005: 8).  
 The unemployment in the eastern part of the country increased to 19.1 percent 
as decline in construction sector occurred and job creation schemes in the East 
German fell from 1 million to roughly 400 000 in late 1990s. In the same time, 
according to the Economist Intelligence, Unit the East Germany’s labour force 
declined from 11 million to 7 million due to early retirement and migration to the 
western part of the country. (EIU, 1999-2000: 19) 
 Despite the collapse of the East German industry in post reunification and the 
huge increase in the East Germany’s wages that surpassed productivity growth, it is 
clear that cyclical downturns contributed to rising unemployment in the east (Wunsch, 
2005: 8). However, it is clear that labour costs were significant problem in the east as 
even in 2000 the wages were a bit lower in the east compared to the west, however 
the average unit labour costs in the east remained 25 percent higher than in the West 
Germany due to lower productivity, except in manufacturing, where the unit labour 
costs were between 5 and 10 percent higher in the east. (EIU, 2000: 33). In addition, 
the situation with wage convergence damaged significantly the collective bargaining 
system in the east as in 2002 more than 70 percent of employers went out of 
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collective bargaining system due to labour union insistence on wage convergence 
with the West Germany (EIU 2002: 33). 
 Concerning the labour market policy the Employment Promotion Act, enacted 
in 1969, was the central pillar of labour market policy in Germany until the end of 
1997, this legislation established unemployment insurance, as its main objective had 
been to alleviate the negative effects of the loss of labour income when unemployed 
(Wunsch, 2005: 10-11). The law was enacted when German economy was at almost 
full employment, and the policy objective “was to keep employment high and to 
constantly improve the employment structure in order to foster economic growth.” 
(Wunsch, 2005: 10). The measures of this policy emphasized the training programs 
aimed to increase the skills of labour force up to the demands at the labour market.  
 In addition, the unemployment insurance contributions in Germany were and 
still are generally divided between employer and employees, and up to 1997 
unemployed who are eligible received between 60 to 70 percent of their previous net 
earnings as unemployment assistance for up to three years, after which time the 
support declines to roughly 55 percent without termination date (EIU, 1999-2000: 19-
20).  
 In the aftermath of raising unemployment after reunification the Social Code III 
has replaced the Employment Promotion Act in 1998 (Wunsch, 2005: 10). The 
measures of the Social Code III are designed to prevent and reduce unemployment 
and provide income support during unemployment, the legislation gave priority to job 
placement schemes over the passive payment of income support under the 
Employment Promotion Act. The Social Code III gave the job placement and training 
schemes the equal priority, and in addition, local employment agencies became more 
active in implementing active labour market policies. However, these measures 
helped little, as the unemployment rate was persistent despite improvement of 
economic conditions in the late 1990s.  
 The legislations from this point onwards were constructed to tighten the rules 
for receiving unemployment benefits and refusal of job offers, as the Agenda 2010 
(also known as Hartz I to IV) reduced the entitlement period for receiving 
unemployment benefits especially for long-term unemployed (EIU, 2005: 35). From 
2002, the Job-AQTIV legislation was introduced, it focused on improving the search 
and monitoring of placement efforts, methods of classification of jobseekers, barriers 
to employment and which assistance is needed upon becoming unemployed. The 
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measures significantly focused on the increase of transparency of unemployment 
insurance funds spending, and the research over the effectiveness of active labour 
market measures under the Social Code III. The part of legislation effective from 
2003 and known as Hartz I and II, aimed to increase the reactivation effectiveness “by 
opening up new opportunities for temporary work, small jobs, self-employment and 
employment in private households.” (Wunsch, 2005: 11).  
 This set of legislations also aimed to reduce the labour costs (EIU, 2004: 37 -
38), tightened the conditions for registering as unemployed (EIU, 2003: 41), and it 
also tightened the conditions for acceptability of jobs and introduced stricter sanction 
in a case of job refusal under Hartz III, which was effective since 2004 (Wunsch, 
2005: 11). And from 2005 Hartz IV focused on the income support for unemployed 
without unemployment benefits claim with main objective of increasing employment 
potential of this group of people (Wunsch, 2005: 11).  
 From the year 2000 the collective bargaining system between labour unions and 
employers has stipulated the moderation in wage growth, especially as real wages in 
tow years prior were in decline (EIU 2001: 38), and from 2006 the unemployment 
benefits were cut by 6.5 percent of gross wages (EIU 2007:  32). In addition, the 
government was tightening public spending from 1993 due to the European Monetary 
Union in order to bring budget deficit below 3 percent, which materialized in 1997, 
and the European Stability and Growth pact inserted constant pressure to meet the aim 
of zero deficit spending over the course of the cycle although this requirement was 
not met in 2002 (EIU, 2002:  31).  
 It is clear that the labour market significantly suffered due to collapse of the 
East Germany’s industry, however the two slowdowns of world economy in 1990s 
and 2000 significantly contributed to the persistence of unemployment. These 
slowdowns were followed by the tightening fiscal policy and labour market policy 
that aimed to cut on unemployment benefits. Such a situation has given a little 
significance to the importance of domestic demand in stipulating growth of 
employment. Thereby, the situation can be characterized as mostly hands-off in terms 
of demand management policies combined with the measures aimed to cut and 
shorten the length of receiving unemployment benefits in order to increase incentives 
to reintegrate into the labour market, resulting in the increase in structural 
unemployment originating from cyclical downturns that created involuntary 
unemployment on a large scale.  
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4.2. Validity of the Neoclassical Explanation  
 
In order to assess the validity of the neoclassical explanation that the structural 
rigidity presents the cause of sluggish growth performance in Germany following 
issues will be addressed. Firstly, how applicable is the Solow model framework for 
explaining the general performance of the economy by comparing Germany with the 
rest of the euro-area. Secondly, what is theoretical rationale for advocating the 
flexible labour market policy and structural reforms, and whether it is applicable? 
Thirdly, whether the demand constrains can be excluded if the assumption of perfect 
substitution between capital and labour is not holding. Fourthly, to which extent the 
surge of unemployment can be characterized as structural problem, and whether the 
wage moderation, the productivity development, and improved export performance 
restored growth of employment and GDP.   
As already discussed in theoretical framework the neoclassical approach is ill 
suited to explain economic development in Germany. The main weakness is that 
Solow growth model is applicable only in the situation where the economy is close to 
full employment, and not the economy that is exhibiting a substantial level of 
unemployment unless that unemployment can be purely attributed to the institutional 
rigidities. Which is relatively questionable as a structural unemployment can be 
caused by lack of demand. In addition since the labour productivity growth has been 
at the same level with the rest of the euro area, it excludes a probability of the lower 
growth rate originating form the productivity differences, at best within such 
framework it can be said that the Germany and other states are most probably not on 
the same production function.  
 The reason to characterize Solow growth model as relying on marginalist 
approach is as it implies that labour and capital contribution to growth is equal to the 
marginal product of labour and capital. Such basis is evident as according to Solow 
the real rental on capital presents the rate of return on capital in units of capital 
(Solow 1956: 80)
9
. As the real rental on capital is consisted of money rental per unit 
of capital divided by the selling price of real output, the same analogy is applied to the 
real money wage paid to the labour which acts as the rate of return on labour. 
Meaning that the elasticity of output with respect to capital and labour can be 
                                                
9
“The real rental on capital q/p is an own-rate of interest - it is the return on capital in units of capital 
stock.” (Solow, 1956: 80).  
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empirically captured through the share of nominal GDP paid to the labour (wage 
share) and to the capital (profit share), which allows the estimation of the level of 
total factor productivity at the aggregate level.
10
 Such approach would strongly argue 
that the level of unemployment is due to structural rigidities, understood as the lack of 
flexibility on the labour market, while the second argument supporting structural 
reforms rests on the proposition that the level of profit is determining factor for the 
continued investments (Lewis, 2009: 56).  
 Lewis (2009: 55-59) explains a theoretical aspect of the neoclassical 
marginalist approach as advocating the flexibility in the labour markets due to a shift 
of demand for low skilled workers. In this framework two suggestions are made to 
support such stance. Firstly, that developing countries have specialized in producing 
unskilled intensive goods pushing developed countries into the production of skill 
intensive goods due to lower prices of unskilled goods around the world. Secondly, 
that new technology conditions higher labour skills. In the condition that there are two 
homogenous labour groups, skilled and unskilled, and that there is technologically 
dynamic high-skilled sector, and technologically stable low skilled sector. Implication 
is that quality as well as quantity of capital in both sectors changed, thereby affecting 
the demand for low and high skilled workers. The result is level of NAIRU, which is 
mostly governed by the supply and demand conditions for low-skilled labour force. 
Thus, introducing structural reforms would lower a supply of low skilled labour force 
by changing institutional setup and allow for greater employment in high skilled 
manufacturing and service sector. But as there is a continued technological advance in 
manufacturing sector, the only way to keep low skilled labour force employment 
constant is ever lowering real wage, so the majority of demand for low skilled labour 
force has to come from service sector. On this basis, the labour force would be 
absorbed as long as the labour costs fall sufficiently, and quantity of capital 
investments does not play any significant role. Thus, the structural rigidity argument 
requires that capital stock, and profitability affect the level of employment, and that 
labour market flexibility affects profitability, while the quantity of capital investments 
shouldn’t play a role.  
Lewis’s (2009: 68-72) investigation, finds neoclassical framework to be 
                                                
10
 Real wages can be estimated as nominal wages (WN) divided by GDP deflator (PD), afterwards 
multiplied with total employment (L) to get aggregate labour cost. The selling real price of aggregate 
output is real GDP (GDPR). The end result is wage share as rate of return to labour: 
(WN/D)(L/GDPR)=[(WN)(L)]/[(GDPR) (PD)] 
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inappropriate. In his investigation of France, Germany, US, and UK, in the time-
period 1992-2005, the only significant relationship is between net investments and 
employment, whereas, the relationship is stronger in the case of US and UK, than in 
the case of France and Germany. The rate of profit and the degree of labour market 
flexibility only show demi-regularity for all four countries, the profitability and net 
investments do not show any significant relation in case of Germany and France, 
while capital stock does not have any effect on employment.  
Concerning the assumption of perfect substitution between capital and labour, 
it is automatically implying that variations in wages would have direct and immediate 
effect on employment. However, if the substitution between labour and capital is not 
perfect (Rowthorn,1999) an increase in investments creates employment, while the 
growth in labour supply will increase unemployment on permanent bases unless offset 
by additional investments. Thus, if there is absence of perfect substitution the demand 
for investments plays significant role.  
 The next point concern the argument that Germany suffers from rigid and 
overregulated labour markets that are major impediment to growth. According to 
Echard Hein and Achim Truger (2005: 6-10), if the comparison concerning labour 
market rigidities is done between 20 OECD countries
11
, and 13 EU countries
12
 and 
Germany, for the time period 1960 to 1999, and calculated average for 1995 to 1999, 
Germany’s labour market is not particularly rigid. Indicators taken in consideration 
are: index of employment protection legislation, total average labour tax burden 
(payroll taxes, social security contributions, labour income tax, consumption taxes), 
benefit replacement rate before taxes as percentage of previous income before taxes, 
index of benefit duration, and index of trade union density, index of wage bargaining 
coordination. Their conclusion is dismissing institutional rigidity as the cause of the 
problem: “On the basis of the data presented for Germany hardly any institutional 
change can be detected that could, according to the institutional sclerosis view, be 
made responsible for Germany’s poor economic performance since the mid 1990s.” 
(Hein & Truger, 2005: 10) 
 When the whole period is taken in consideration, the labour market reforms 
                                                
11
 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA.  
 
12
 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, United Kingdom. 
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were conducted practically since reunification together with wage moderation policy, 
as already seen in the section 5. If the development of the unemployment rate is 
recalled from the graph 4, it is obvious that unemployment surge after 2000 cannot be 
caused by increased labour market rigidities. Simply, Germany does not suffer from 
overregulated labour markets compared to the other EU countries.    
Despite little evidence of the labour market inflexibility, economic policy in 
Germany has been conducted in a way to increase labour market flexibility, 
consolidate government budget, freeze wage growth, and improve exports. According 
to OECD (2008: 33), there has been a consolidation of government expenditures, due 
to decreased subsidies, social security benefits and wage growth in public sector, but 
also the social security contributions have lowered significantly as the source of 
government revenue. In addition, Germany under the pressure to stabilize its budget 
deficit constantly due to the Stability and Growth Pact, and the budget deficit was 
stabilized at 4 percent of GDP in 2003 for the first time since 1989 (OECD, 2007: 
52).  
Furthermore, with a goal to increase work incentives, unemployment benefit 
replacement rates for long-term unemployed, as well as early retirement options were 
significantly lowered. The employment protection for regular employment was 
diminished in order to enable better employment possibilities for those with weak 
attachment to labour market. (OECD 2007: 39-40) 
These measure coupled with wage moderation effect should have a positive 
effect on overall growth due to gains from external sector. According to ECFIN 
(2007a: 17) the wage moderation in Germany prevented increase in the real effective 
exchange rate thus restoring international competitiveness, due to wage increase that 
averaged only 2 ! percent and productivity gains of 3 ! percent. Thus, productivity 
gain and improved international competitiveness should have contributed to growth of 
employment and GDP.  
However, as already presented in the problem field, the productivity growth 
seems not to be at all lower than in the rest of the euro-area, while the employment 
growth and GDP growth lag significantly. Furthermore, by comparing growth of 
labour productivity, real GDP and employment (graph 5), there seems to be rather 
large disparity especially as the productivity was increasing throughout the whole 
period both employment growth and GDP growth seem not to follow such 
development. Since 1997 productivity gains and GDP seem not to match, especially 
 60 
as in 2002 and 2003 real GDP was stagnant or declined, while the growth of 
employment seems to loosely follow GDP growth since 1998.  
 
Graph 5: Growth of GDP, Labour Productivity and Employment in Germany  
 
Source: OECD 
 
The other interesting observation is concerning export performance which indeed 
improved after 2000, however, such development does not follow productivity and 
GDP evolution. (graph 6). 
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Graph 6: Export and Imports of Goods and Services in Germany 
 
Source: OECD 
 
To summarize, the economic indicators seem not to follow the implications of the 
standard neoclassical approach, furthermore, Germany in the first place did not have 
particularly rigid labour market, nor did labour market rigidity increase since 2000, 
yet unemployment did. Such development cannot be solely and only contributed to 
too high labour costs nor lack of flexibility in the labour market. Thereby, on the basis 
of the arguments presented in this section, coupled with the inappropriate assumptions 
of the neoclassical approach it is reasonable to exclude the neoclassical approach as 
the valid tool for explaining the performance of German economy since reunification.  
 
4.3. Demand Constraints to Growth 
 
Based on the initial mapping of the performance of German economy, Keynesian idea 
of demand constraint growth seem to comply with the initial empirical observation of 
the GDP growth rate, aggregate demand and employment as shown in the graph 7. 
The reunification shock and disparity between productivity gains and wages between 
East and West Germany probably plays a role in the slowdown, however, it is highly 
unlikely that the economy as a whole is stagnating throughout the whole period due to 
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inflexible labour markets and loss of international competitiveness. Alternative 
explanation might be that in the aftermath of reunification the growth composition in 
Germany started shifting from export based to domestically based growth. Such logic 
would imply that in the aftermath of the collapse of GDR industry and loss of export 
market, the Germany’s overall export and import pattern change significantly and that 
inclusion of former GDR’s population made shifting demand pattern.  
 
Graph 7: Growth of GDP, Demand and Employment in Germany 
 
Note: Aggregate demand is calculated as the sum of government final consumption expenditures, private final consumption expenditures, 
gross fixed capital formation, and exports 
Source: OECD 
 
Of the components of aggregate demand in Germany’s case investment growth seems 
to have high significance throughout the whole period, as by using OECD dataset and 
correlation between growth of investments and GDP is clear. The correlation 
coefficients between growth rates of investments and GDP growth are showing strong 
and significant relation (for net investment growth and GDP growth coefficient is 
0.71, while for gross investment growth and GDP growth is 0.8). Thereby, the 
theoretical framework based on Harrod’s model and Kaleckian models seems to be a 
useful tool, especially as German economy exhibits high unemployment. 
 By using Harrod’s growth model it is possible to bring forth the implications 
of the warranted rate being above the actual rate of growth. As the warranted rate of 
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growth shows at which rate economy should expand so that capital is fully employed, 
if the economy is running below this growth rate there will be persistent 
unemployment. Secondly, if the economy is over extended period running below 
warranted rate then the warranted rate will eventually lower, as the capital 
accumulation slows down, resulting in a negative spiral of low capital accumulation 
and long-term unemployment. In Harrod’s framework the excess capacity is 
happening due to too low investments, as the investment ratio is lower than the one 
required for full utilization of capital. The warranted rate of growth can be calculated 
by simply substituting savings ratio with the investment ratio, and required 
incremental capital to output ratio with the capital to output ratio. This rate of growth 
cannot be used to predict how much investments should be increased in the future but 
it can show that realised investments lag with the supply of capital in the economy. 
The graph 8 shows the development in the actual growth rate, warranted growth rate, 
and capital to output ratio.  
 
Graph 8: Capital to Output Ratio, Warranted and Actual Growth Rate in Germany 
 
Source: OECD 
 
Throughout the whole time period after the reunification, capital to output ratio was 
increasing, and the gap between actual and warranted growth rate was persistent 
throughout the whole period with the exclusion of 2006. In addition, the fall of 
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warranted growth rate seems to support Harrod’s idea of the actual growth rate 
dragging down the warranted growth rate. The interesting point is that the gap 
between warranted and actual growth rates started narrowing down since 2000 due to 
a significant fall in warranted rate of growth, this coincides with lowering of 
investment ratio after 2000 (graph 9). As it seems, in Germany the expansion of 
investments was not appropriate to generate the growth rate needed for employment 
the whole labour force. 
 
Graph 9: Comparison Between Investment Ratio and Real GDP Growth in Germany  
Source: OECD 
 
This is due to divergence of required incremental capital to output ratio and the 
incremental capital to output ratio that actually occurs. The required incremental 
capital to output ratio is the planned investments in ratio to the potential increment of 
output, while the actual incremental capital to output ratio is the demanded 
investments and the relationship to increment of output. In this case capital to output 
ratio is used instead of required incremental capital to output ratio the model would 
indicate that the divergence occurs when actual investments fall short of their 
potential level, resulting in excess capacity. The slowdown in rate of capital 
accumulation seems to occur throughout the whole period but more rapid in the 
aftermath of 2000. 
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According to the Kalecki’s theoretical framework it is possible that 
investments are being constrained by the lack of domestic demand despite the profit 
share and rate of profit are rising. This interpretation implies that a shift of income 
from wages to profits results in low contribution to the actual growth as profit holders 
tend to refrain from investing, but the profit rate increases as the profit holders obtain 
larger share of output. Such an interpretation can be summarized in the ‘Paradox of 
Profit’ view where the policies that aimed to increase aggregate profit, or savings in 
the economy would result in lowering of consumption and thereby investments, 
instead of increasing investments. In this instance profits is to be considered as lagged 
variable in the economic system, meaning that profits are rather to be thought as 
consequence rather than a cause of economic growth. Thus, the growth of German 
economy can be considered as either profit or wage led. In the case of wage led 
growth the domestic demand component has large influence and the connection 
between profit and investment growth should not be clear-cut. In the case, of profit 
led growth the investments should be much more dependent on the profit increase and 
in this instance exports should contribute more significantly impacting growth. Export 
performance is important, as due to supply side view wage moderation should 
increase international competitiveness.   
In this regard the inspiration can be drawn from Ederer’s and Stockhammers’s 
investigation for France (Ederer & Stockhammer in Hein & Truger ed., 2007: 119-
135), where the wage cut policy and redistribution of income in favour of profits 
could stimulate the economy due to gains in net exports. However, instead of 
performing the empirical investigation based on the consumption, investment, export 
and import function, the report will present the development of profits, profit rate and 
investments. In this instance it should be expected that there is a mismatch in growth 
of profits and investments, or at least lack of clear-cut correlation.  
The mismatch complies with empirical observation, as the correlation 
coefficient between the annual growth of aggregate profits and gross investments, 
which is 0.60, signifies that there is no unambiguous relation. Furthermore, if after-
tax profits growth and gross investment growth is correlated, there is not a sign of any 
significant relation (correlation coefficient of -0.07). These developments are shown 
in the graph 10. 
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Graph 10: Growth Rate of Profits and Investments in Germany 
 
Note: Profits are calculated as nominal GDP minus wages; after-tax profit is calculated as nominal GDP minus wages, direct and indirect 
taxes. Both values are deflated with GDP def. 
Source: OECD 
 
 
After 1997, the profit growth and investment growth seems to loose any connection, 
which might indicate the shift of the growth pattern from profit led to wage led, as the 
former GDR is reintegrated. The shift of income is apparent when wage and profit 
share are taken in consideration graph 11. From the year 2000, profit share is on the 
rise while wage share plummets indicating clear redistribution of income.  
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Graph 11: Wage and Profit Share in Germany 
 
Note: Wage and profit share are calculated as percentage of nominal GDP less indirect and total direct taxes 
Source: OECD 
 
When the rate of profit is taken in consideration (calculated as the ratio of net 
operating surplus and net capital stock) it does not show unambiguous strong 
correlation to the growth of net investments, but the significant correlation exists 
(0.51). The correlation in a case of gross investments is not significant (0.43). 
Development of rate of profits and growth of investments is shown on the graph 12. 
Graph 12: Growth of Investments and Profit Rate in Germany 
 
Source: OECD 
 68 
 
 
The rate of profit calculation does not show significant divergence between data set 
used by Paul Lewis (2009: 62). The data used by Paul Lewis are for the time period 
1992-2005 and the rate of profit from this report follows similar development up to 
the year 2003. Both datasets show the increase in rate of profit from 2003 onwards 
though in Lewis’s example it is at the smaller scale.  
As it has been shown despite the growth of profits and increase in profit rate 
the investment growth seems not to follow correspondingly, and GDP growth 
completely lacks. Additionally, the investment ratio (graph 13) was converging to the 
level of the other EU countries and significantly declined after 2000, with a recovery 
from 2006, indicating clear slowdown in the rate of capital accumulation compared to 
the previous level of capital accumulation. Throughout whole period German 
economy was more capital intensive than the rest of the EU area.  
  
Graph 13: Investment Ratio in Germany and the Rest of the EU 
 
Source: EUROSTAT 
 
When the development of the components of domestic demand (graph 14) is taken in 
consideration there is a clear slowdown in private consumption after the year 2000, 
which turns into the decline after 2002. This coincides with the lower investment ratio 
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while the rebound of investment ratio seems to coincide with the recovery of export 
growth from 2006. Furthermore, according to the investigation performed by Hein 
and Truger (2005: 5) in the time period 1995-2004, compared to the time period 
1985-1995, the contribution of net foreign demand to growth rate of GDP has 
increased significantly (from 0.2 to 0.5 percentage points), while the growth 
contribution of domestic demand has severely fallen (from 2.6 to 0.8 percentage 
points). These indicators signify that consumption and exports played significant role 
in Germany’s economic performance throughout the reunification time period, and in 
the same time the dramatic decrease of domestic demand seems to strongly reaffirms 
the Kaleckian implication of consumption as the contributor to growth.  
 
Graph 14: Individual Components of Aggregate Demand in Germany 
 
Source: OECD 
 
The domestic consumption largely depends on the wage development and according 
to the ECFIN (2007a: 42) wages in Germany were decelerating since 1993. In 
addition, actual wage growth was among the lowest in the euro area. When the look is 
taken at the productivity increase, compensation per employee and real unit labour 
cost. It is evident that throughout the whole period unit labour cost was decreasing, 
while productivity was increasing throughout the whole period, with the exclusion of 
year 2005 (graph 15). By this there was a room for greater wage growth that would be 
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compensated by the productivity increases. However, previous claim should be taken 
with caution as it might be the case that some of the increases in productivity are 
caused by the falling employment, as ECFIN’s report (ECFIN 2007a: 42) estimates 
that a part of a decline in real unit labour cost is due to increased unemployment, 
which increased capital to labour ratio and resulted in a statistical boost to the labour 
productivity.  Furthermore, the development of the real unit labour cost after 2000 
coincides clearly with the slowdown and decline of consumption. Also, German 
households have altered their consumption habits in aftermath of recession, especially 
higher savings ratio is observed among younger households (ECFIN, 2007a: 18-20).   
 
Graph 15: Growth of Labour Productivity, Compensation per Employee and Real Unit Labour Cost in Germany 
 
Note: The OECD database served as the source for labour productivity and compensation per employee, while The EUROSTAT databases 
served as the source for real unit labour cost 
 Source: OECD and EUROSTAT  
 
Empirical data signify that investments are demand constrained, and that demand is 
likely to be constrained by the low consumption, leading to the excess savings in the 
economy, rather than being a consequence of supply side rigidities. In combination 
with the increase in profit rate and profit share the data seems to support Kaleckian 
and Harrodian view that redistribution of income to profits has a negative effect on 
level of capacity utilization leading to lower rates of capital accumulation and lower 
growth rates with persistent unemployment. Thus, it seems that in German case 
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paradox of costs holds. These indicators are in support of Gustav Horn’s (Hein & 
Truger, ed.2007: 158) argument that the low growth and unemployment in Germany 
might not originate from to high labour costs, quite the contrary the cause seems to be 
too low income and increase in profits that result in higher savings rather than 
investments. 
 In other words German economy seems to be in profit-led pattern of growth 
due to positive contribution of net exports in recent year, however, this development 
came at the expense of domestic demand, resulting in overall lower growth of 
employment and output than it could be without increase in profit share.  
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4.3.1. Policy Conduct and Government Role 
 
The development of indicators seems to support the view that German economy has 
suffered the demand constraint at least after 2000. From the point of view of 
economic policy it seems that Germany tried to pursue export oriented growth 
approach combined with introducing flexible labour market policy. As monetary 
policy is conducted at the EU level, Germany had a possibility only to use 
expansionary fiscal policy during downturns of demand, which seems to be the case 
throughout the whole time period. However, due to the Maastricht convergence 
criteria
13
 and the Stability and Growth Pact
14
, which were still in effect, the fiscal 
policy constrains of having budget deficit no larger than 3 and reducing public debt to 
below 60 percent of GDP were present. When looking at downturn of 2000 it is 
evident that government was engaged at least partially in expansionary fiscal policy 
especially as German government on several occasion called on ECB to loosen 
monetary policy (Werner in Hein & Truger, ed.2007: 187). This is evident from the 
overview over sector balances in German economy (graph 16). As Germany did 
breach Maastricht requirements this resulted in Germany being subject to Excessive 
Deficit Procedure in 2003, which led to fiscal consolidation (OECD, 2008: 38). 
                                                
13
 Maastricht treaty convergence criteria requires of a state to meet:  
1. A maximum budget deficit of 3 per cent of GDP per annum; 
2. A maximum total public sector debt of 60 per cent of GDP; 
3. There are to be no realignments within the ERM; 
4. A rate of inflation of a maximum of 1.5 percent above the average rate in the three lowest 
inflation EU countries  
5. Long-term interest rates should be a maximum of 2 per cent above the average of those in 
the three lowest rate countries. 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/economic_and_monetary_affairs/institutional_and_ec
onomic_framework/l25014_en.htm  
14
 Council Regulations (EC) no. 1466/97 of 7th June 1997 (OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1-5), and 
(EC) no. 1467/97 of 7
th
 July 1997 (OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 6-11), as well “The Resolution of 
the European Council of 17 June 1997 on the Stability and Growth Pact” (OJ C 236 
2.8.1997, p. 1-2) 
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Graph 16: Sector Balances in Germany 
 
Source: OECD 
 
From the empirical perspective two indicators can show to which extent fiscal policy 
is affecting the business cycle in stabilizing or destabilizing manner, one is the change 
in government primary balance and output gap, and the second is change in 
government final consumption expenditure, especially real government investments 
(Hein & Truger, 2005: 14-16). The output gap can be used for measuring a current 
state of economic activity as when the indicator is positive the demand is higher than 
the supply, and when negative there is excess capacity. Secondly, ratio of cyclically 
adjusted primary government balance to potential output can be seen as fiscal policy 
instrument that is a cause of the changes in output. Generally, primary government 
balance is depending the cyclical tendencies but when cyclical component is 
removed, then this indicator shows expansionary or restrictive fiscal stance. If the 
change in cyclically adjusted primary government balance to potential GDP ratio is 
negative then it is the case of expansionary fiscal policy, while if it is positive it 
indicates restrictive fiscal policy, if it is constant when output gap changes then 
automatic stabilizers take effect. This indicator combined with the change in potential 
output shows whether the fiscal policy is expansionary or restrictive during upturns or 
downturns, as when the change in potential output is positive then it is the case of 
upturn, and vice verse. The government investments in particular show to which 
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extent does government invest in infrastructure or complementing private 
investments. Hein and Trueger consider government investments to have a positive 
contribution to growth in the case of Germany (Hein & Truger, 2005: 16).  
 
Graph 17: Effect of Fiscal Policy in Germany 
 
Source: OECD 
 
According to the change in output gap and cyclically adjusted primary government 
balance (graph17) Germany had 8 years with pro-cyclical fiscal policy, of which 5 are 
during economic downturn, namely 1992, 1993, 1996, 2003, and 2004. If this 
development is matched with the evolution of output gap throughout period (graph 
18), it is clear that even by considering growth rate at NAIRU level as full capacity 
growth, the demand was lagging behind the supply throughout the most of the time-
period.  
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Graph 18: Output Gap in Germany 
Source: OECD 
 
Furthermore, if Hein’s and Truger’s proposition for viewing development of public 
investments is taken in consideration (Hein & Truger, 2005: 14-15), it seems that 
German economy did have restrictive fiscal stance throughout the most of the time 
period as the public investment level was relatively low and growth of public 
investments was shrinking most of the time (Graph 19). 
Graph 19: Breakdown of Government Expenditures in Germany  
Source: OECD 
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 The development in these indicators supports the Hein’s and Truger’s view 
(Hein & Truger, 2005: 15-16) that the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth 
Pact have enforced constraints to fiscal policy since mid 1990, resulting in restrictive 
fiscal policies in face of economic slowdown. This especially the case with decline in 
public investments that resulted in public investments having a relatively small share 
in total GDP. Furthermore, Ekchard and Truger (Hein & Truger, 2005: 20-21) 
postulate that such policy development coupled with too restrictive monetary policy at 
the EMU level is particularly unfavourable for Germany, where inflation is below rest 
of the EMU, as the result is higher interest rates, and as Werner (Hein & Truger ed., 
2007: 196-210) argues deteriorates possible effectiveness of fiscal policy due to lack 
of credit expansion. The overall situation is aggravated by the wage moderation that 
took place throughout the whole time period. 
 
Graph 20: Growth of Total Employment During Cyclical Change in Germany 
 
Source: OECD 
 
In general, the employment growth in Germany did follow the moments of economic 
downturn (as shown in the graph 20), as the correlation between change in output gap 
and growth of employment is strong (correlation coefficient 0.68). Coupled with the 
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restrictive fiscal policy it is no surprise that the demand was far from being 
stimulated. 
To sum up, more than a decade of wage moderation, strong policy focus on 
improving exports through structural reforms, and pressure on fiscal policy did not 
materialize in higher growth rates. The GDP did recover slightly from 2005 but this is 
due to increase in exports. These developments seem to confirm the trade-off between 
regaining the surplus on the current account through wage moderating policy. It 
seems that the policy conduct rested on the neoclassical reasoning of the cause hiding 
in the structural rigidities in the labour market and lowered export performance. 
Implication is detachment of employment policy from macroeconomic policy leading 
to the constraints of domestic demand. All this happened despite the economic 
expansion conditions changed toward greater dependence on domestic consumption. 
As already, seen the overall structural rigidity of the economy was not based on actual 
rigidity of Germany’s labour market institutions, thereby, it is questionable to put 
policy focus on reforms that should restructure social security system and regaining 
export position. 
 Furthermore, in the time period 2001-2005 the combination of monetary, 
fiscal and wage policy was particularly harmful to Germany as during this period 
Germany had a lower inflation than the rest of the euro area resulting in higher 
interest rates (Hein & Truger, ed., 2007: 222-223). Thus, economic environment was 
overall unfavourable for growth of demand and thereby employment and GDP 
growth.  
  
4.4. Endogeneity of Natural and Potential Growth Rate 
 
This section presents theoretical discussion of what determines the natural growth rate 
and whether the natural growth rate is a speed limit of actual growth of output.  
Thirlwall (2002: 86-96) presents the theoretical possibility that the natural 
rate, as well as the productivity is endogenous, meaning that it depends on the 
demand development. This is possible as the growth of labour force is elastic to 
demand due to increase in participation rates and hours worked when demand is high. 
In addition, the growth of labour productivity is also likely to be sensitive to the 
changes in demand. This happens due to increase in static and dynamic economies of 
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scale associated with expanding volume of production and embodied technical 
progress incorporated in capital accumulation. This possibility does not exclude the 
importance of supply side policies, but it brings importance of demand management 
policies in the long-run. Thirwall conducted empirical study in the case of 15 OECD 
countries, including Germany, for the time period 1961-1995 and found that natural 
growth rate shows to be endogenous for all 15 countries. In Germany’s case the 
increase in potential growth rate estimated by Thirwall was 3.51 percent, and during 
boom periods it increased to 4.71 percent. 
15
  
On the other hand, the original neoclassical Solow (1956) model perspective is 
that the natural growth rate is determined independently of the actual and that natural 
growth rate determines the movement of the actual growth. This is the case as the 
actual rate is assumed to be equal to the warranted rate, and according to Solow 
warranted rate has to converge to the level of natural rate of growth. However, 
mainstream studies have substituted natural growth rate with the growth rate of 
potential output. The main difference between potential and natural growth rate is 
already discussed in section 2.1.1 but for convenience of the argument it will be 
repeated. The potential output depends upon: “[…] the capital stock, the potential 
labour force (which depends on demographic factors and on participation rates), the 
non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU), and the level of labour 
efficiency.”
16
 Thereby, the studies that use potential output essentially replace the 
natural growth rate that is full-employment growth rate with the NAIRU consistent 
growth rate. As one of the determinants of potential output is the increase in labour 
productivity, OECD (2008: 40) recommends the increase in labour productivity so 
that potential GDP growth rate in Germany is increase. Such interpretation only 
acknowledges the unidirectional causality of accumulation and productivity of factor 
inputs determining the pace of economic expansion. Moreover, the OECD states that 
the main reason behind the shortfall of potential output in Germany compared to US 
level is low number of total hours worked in Germany (OECD .2008: 32) 
However, Thriwall’s argument on the channels through which natural growth 
rate is endogenous seems to also partially apply to the growth of potential output, at 
                                                
15
 For more details on Thirwalls investigation on endogeneity of potential growth rate 
look at Thirwall Anthony. P. & Leon-Lensma, Miguel A.”The endogeneity of natural 
growth rate”, Cambridge Journal of Economics 2002, No. 26, pp. 441-459 
16
 http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=2094  
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least as concerning the growth of labour productivity and total hours worked. 
Thereby, no matter if the natural or potential growth rate is used as a reference, the 
demand influence cannot be excluded easily. 
 In this report there will be no actual tests of potential output being endogenous 
to the actual rate of growth but the comparison of potential and actual rate of growth 
is presented in the graph 21.  
 
Graph 21: Potential and Actual Growth Rate in Germany 
 
Source: OECD 
 
The decline of potential growth rate is evident from the year 2002. Such development 
is as likely to be caused by the demand constraint, and inclusion of only one 
directional causality in economic analysis seems rather single minded. Another 
interesting observation is that the warranted rate of growth is potential throughout the 
period. This observation even in the case when natural growth rate is exchanged with 
the potential growth rate complies with implication of Harrod’s model that in this case 
investments will be depressed leading to unemployment. If such explanation is 
accepted, German economy indeed suffers from too low rate of capital accumulation 
caused by too low domestic demand, which cannot be compensated by external 
component of demand, exports. 
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5. Effect of Economic Policy and Recommendations  
 
The policy response to stagnant growth and persistent unemployment was to 
introduce structural reforms in order to increase labour market flexibility, including 
wage moderation and government engage in expansionary fiscal policy but in 
aftermath of 2000 slump it was forced to conduct fiscal consolidation. The reason for 
restoring fiscal balance in line with the Stability and Growth Pact and Maastricht 
convergence criteria was in order to bring fiscal policy in line with monetary policy of 
stable inflation. Also, the restructuring of the social security system brought a tax 
burden relief for firms and higher burden for households (Horn in Hein & Truger, ed., 
2007: 162). The rationale for the policy structural reforms implemented after 2000 
and wage moderation that is persistent over the whole time-period is twofold. On one 
hand, these reforms would tighten the conditions for refusing lower paid jobs and 
shorten the length of time under which unemployed can receive unemployment 
benefits, thus increasing incentives to find a job in the first year of unemployment 
(Horn in Hein, & Truger ed., 2007: 160). On the other hand these policies should have 
an effect on lowering wages and increasing international competitiveness (Ibid.). As 
the result the lower labour costs and increased international competitiveness should 
increase employment, which would lead to increased income and consumption, this 
coupled with higher exports due to gains in international competitiveness should 
result in higher growth rate. However, as Gustav Horn argues (Hein & Truger ed., 
2007: 160-162) in order for such policies to work the sluggish growth has to be 
caused by too high labour costs, decline in the reserve wage has to happen in the real 
terms, elasticity of employment needs be high enough in order for employment to be 
increase proportionally. Additionally, in the economy with large domestic market if 
there is no labour cost problem there can be tightening of domestic demand despite 
improvement of exports, if domestic demand effect prevails the economy will grow 
slower (Ibid.). As shown in the previous section, German economy is likely to be 
demand constrained and the conduct of economic policy seemed inadequate to the 
cause of stagnant growth. 
Essentially the policy of increasing flexibility in the labour market can result 
in increased employment efforts and lead to higher labour utilization but such effect is 
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only to be expected during economic upturn (Horn in Hein & Truger ed., 2007: 161).  
The shock of reunification and equalization of West and East Germany’s currencies 
resulted in deterioration of the East Germany’s industry. This created the initial 
problem of unemployment which is persistent to this day. However, in the same time 
development of demand conditions and wage moderation policy despite bringing the 
East Germany’s wages in line with productivity growth also created an economy wide 
problem as it lowered consumption. The effect of the structural reforms and wage 
moderation altogether seems to have negative effect on the restoration of demand and 
negatively affected investments. The negative feedback mechanism that keeps the 
demand low while in the same time profitability increases keeping Germany’s firms 
continuing to modestly invest, and as a result unemployment is kept at the roughly 
same level.  
In a situation when the demand constraint is present the question is whether 
government policies can stimulate the economy or such intervention is 
counterproductive? This point requires elaboration firstly concerning the possibility of 
positive effect of fiscal policy and secondly whether expansionary fiscal policy is 
possible under the centralized monetary policy, in other words how is fiscal deficit 
going to be financed.  
Concerning the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus there are two distinct views of 
whether the fiscal policy can be effective tool. Post-Keynesian approach regards the 
role of fiscal policy as a useful tool for stimulating economy, while the neoclassical 
approach differs substantially in regards to this question. Models such as Solow 
model ignore the possibility of fiscal policy affecting long-run growth rate, despite in 
the short run fiscal policy can increase or decrease income, while the new endogenous 
growth models recognize the possibility of fiscal policy to accelerate factor 
accumulation in the long-run (Laramie & Mair in Hein & Truger ed., 2007: 172).  
Stiglitz explains the role of fiscal policy in stabilizing the economy (Stiglitz, 
Ocampo, Spiegel, Ffrench-Davis & Nayyar, 2006: 49-70). The main argument of 
fiscal policy being ineffective in stimulating demand relies on the proposition that 
economy will automatically stabilize itself at full employment or NAIRU. In addition, 
according to this argument the increase of fiscal deficit leads to households 
recognizing that the economic slowdown has set in, and that they will have to repay 
the dept resulting in the increase of savings instead of stimulus to consumption. 
Furthermore, public investments can be counterproductive, as when the economy is 
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functioning at full capacity there would crowding out effect on private investment. 
But if the economy is not close to full employment there is no crowding out effect at 
all. In fact, there is a large possibility that government investments complement 
private investments and cause a crowding in effect thereby stimulating economy. 
Though the government investments might be less productive than private 
investments, government spending activates increased demand for the output of the 
private companies. Thus, the increased expenditure itself should lead to expansion of 
output through the stimulus to aggregate demand. The other instrument, tax-cuts 
supplements growth due to extra income that is translated in increase of consumption, 
which in turn increases demand for output that would increase the demand for labour. 
However, tax cuts stimulate consumption if they go to those who do not have credit, 
as many households and small and medium enterprises can be credit constrained in 
times of economic downturn. In the sum extra income, or profits can be used for 
consumption or reinvestment, depending are they targeted to businesses or 
households. But if firms are not investing due to slow expansion of demand then 
lifting tax burden of firms cannot result in increase of demand as the initial problem is 
lack of consumption as households refraining from consuming due to low income.  
In addition, the increase of public expenditure is preferable to tax relief, as 
multipliers associated with government expenditure are larger than tax multipliers as 
long as the government funds are used to stimulate sectors that are selling 
domestically produced goods. Tax income cuts can be even unfavourable as they can 
stimulate imports and thus deteriorate balance on current account.  
Simply, the investment spending affects output by 100 per cent spent, while 
tax relief only flows into output partially as a portion of money is saved while a part is 
translated into the investments and consumption (Horn in Hein & Truger ed., 2007: 
165). However, if there is a constrain on the government deficit during downturns 
government has to conduct cuts in spending, this affects the investment projects to be 
left unfinished or there are delays in executing these projects, resulting in the raise of 
their effective costs (Stiglitz et al., 2006: 67-73). 
Thus, fiscal policy can be effective tool in stimulating economy with running 
below full employment. During economic downturns and lack of demand public 
sector investments are good tool and more favourable than tax cuts, while restrictive 
public spending during slumps worsens the situation.  
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The second consideration is based on the financing of public expenditures. 
When government goes into deficit to raise public expenditures, government has to 
finance public sector borrowing requirement. Werner (Hein & Truger, ed. 2007: 196-
210) explains the both types of deficit financing This can be done through two 
channels by debt financing, where government borrows from the private sector, and 
by money financing, where government creates money directly, or borrows form the 
central bank which in turn expands money supply. In general the money financed 
government expenditures is more effective than bond-financed. However, if the 
standard quantity theory of money is used the bond-financed expenditures are causing 
the quantity based crowding out at the unchanged money supply, even if the economy 
is below full capacity. Such effect happens in standard interpretation of quantity 
equation any exogenous change in government expenditures cannot affect total 
nominal GDP unless the money supply is altered. Simply any increase in government 
spending has to crowd out proportional amount of private spending. Werner modified 
the quantity equation to incorporate credit view of money then it is indeed possible 
for crowding out effect happens but only if the banking system does not additionally 
expand credit in light of increased government claims on existing credit, which is 
caused by deficit financing. Werner shows that the proposition based the standard 
quantity based interpretation is not applicable in the case of Germany as link between 
money supply and nominal GDP has broken down, whereas credit view holds.  
The main rationale of the EMU to impose a constraint on public sector deficit 
was to avoid the type of crowding out in a sense of standard quantity base 
interpretation, and thus to avoid the pressure on central bank to expand money supply. 
However, as soon the credit view is incorporated the government has a possibility to 
monetize fiscal stance without support from the central bank, simply by borrowing 
from commercial banks (Werner in Hein & Truger ed., 2007: 206-207). In this way 
the overall credit is expanded and fiscal policy would not cause any crowding out 
effect, while the central bank would be able to alter money supply but only in regard 
to the overall liquidity requirement of commercial banks. Furthermore, it is possible 
to conduct expansionary fiscal policy since from March 2005 the Stability and 
Growth Pact was eased in regard to declaring country as being in excessive deficit.
17
  
                                                
17
 Speech by José Manuel González-Páramo, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB 
Conference on “New Perspectives on Fiscal Sustainability” Frankfurt, 13 October 2005. 
http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2005/html/sp051013.en.html  
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On the basis of previous arguments it is clear that public expenditures can be 
effective in stimulating demand restrained economy and that no crowding out effect 
can happen as long credit is expanded. Thus, the proper policy response has to consist 
of expansionary fiscal policy, where public investments can be particularly useful tool 
in initiating and complementing private investments. Public investments can be 
implemented in form of public-private partnerships in areas with high unemployment. 
In such a way government does not subsidize production, nor deteriorates competition 
but mainly gives incentives to private enterprises, coupled with shifting investment 
risks. Secondly, tax cuts if conducted should be kept as secondary tool and targeted to 
those with low purchasing power, not as currently done to enterprises, however such 
measure can also increase imports. Thirdly, the uniformed monetary policy for the 
whole EMU can be bypassed through the deficit financing by commercial banks. In 
such manner the inflation can be slightly increased and real interest rates lowered to 
the rest of the EMU level.  
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6. Conclusion  
 
 
This report presents the Post-Keynesian view on the economic slowdown in Germany 
since its reunification. The Post-Keynesian theoretical framework was chosen on the 
basis of its applicability in the case of Germany, and more realistic assumptions 
compared to neoclassical approach. The goal of the analysis was to explore whether 
demand constraints have played a role in the sluggish economic growth since 
reunification. This explanation does not exclude the possible usefulness of the supply 
side policies but it draws attention to the demand side constraints that can restrict the 
growth in employment and output sooner than supply side rigidities. The conduct of 
the analysis was to match relevant economic indicators and view them from demand 
constraint perspective supplemented with other studies on the growth of output and 
employment in Germany since reunification. The overall conclusion is in favour of 
the demand side constraints and it does not exclude need for the structural reforms, 
but it argues that supply side management can only yield positive effect during 
economic upturns, and can be rather damaging if they restrain demand development.  
The lack of demand is likely to be a significant cause of the lagging growth of 
output growth and employment compared to the rest of the euro area despite similar 
pace of productivity growth. The economic indicators are more in favour of the Post-
Keynesian framework than neoclassical. As shown in the section 6 the rate of growth 
that is required to fully employ capital in the economy was far above the actual 
growth rate and this is mainly caused by low growth of investments. Due to low 
investment growth and declining investment ratio output of the economy is 
constrained and there are low gains in employment. The underlying reason for a 
sluggish investment growth is the low domestic demand growth that is mostly fuelled 
by domestic consumption. This is due to wage moderation policy that are being 
implemented since 1990s, and from the yea 2000 there is increase in profit share of 
the economy indicating further shift of income distribution toward enterprises. As the 
profit rate continues to increase but there is low increase in the level of capacity 
utilization the firms are not expanding their activities at the level that can fully 
employ labour force. However, due to wage moderation the international 
competitiveness in neoclassical sense has been restored giving raise to exports and 
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turning the balance on the current account into the surplus. The downside is that gains 
in the external sector did not manage to compensate for the decline in domestic 
demand leaving the unemployment level at the same pace. This implies that the 
consequence of shifting income distribution toward enterprises coupled with policies 
aimed to bring surplus on the current account did little to increase the growth of 
domestic demand leading to overall lower growth rate. The export-based growth 
might be a good strategy for the economy with small domestic market, however, in an 
economy with relatively large domestic market, such as Germany, export-oriented 
growth is not able to compensate for the demand fall in domestic markets.  
In the case of unemployment, the structural rigidity might be valid explanation if 
unemployment rate did not increased significantly after the year 2000. If the 
neoclassical argument was true such unemployment should have been structural in 
character and caused by increased labour market rigidities since 2000. Since at that 
time Germany started implementing labour market reforms, structural rigidity should 
have been lessened, thereby the increase of unemployment since 2000 hardly can be 
structural. Furthermore, the NAIRU itself is likely to increase due to hystersis effect 
meaning that cyclical unemployment is likely to create structural if the slump of 
demand remains unaltered in prolonged period of time. Thirdly, by increase in capital 
input and perfect substitution between labour and capital unemployment should not 
increase. This substitution is assumed to be hindered by to high wages, but since the 
wage moderation policy was in place for substantial amount of time, this should have 
both increased labour supply and given incentives to entrepreneurs to increase 
investments and employment. However, this type of unidirectional causality is not 
holding in the aftermath of the year 2000, as the implementation of policies that are 
favourable for entrepreneurs was perfect the shift of income toward profits should 
have increased both growth of output and employment which did not materialize until 
2005. In addition, even in employing neoclassical framework the lack of capital 
accumulation results in unemployment but in Germany’s case the lack of capital 
accumulation steams from domestic demand constraint.  
 The fiscal policy conduct, as shown in the section 7, was inadequate to 
provide stimulus to aggregate demand. The government investments were quite low 
and their growth was negative throughout the period, this effect coupled together with 
wage restraining policy resulted in the negative environment for improving domestic 
demand. This factor coupled with centrally set monetary policy and low inflation 
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further aggravated investment environment. The Stability and Growth Pact 
requirements did impose policy constraint to German economy signifying that 
monetary union might have had negative effect on the German economy, however, 
neither single currency nor centralized monetary policy give meaningful rationale for 
restraining fiscal spending. German state could have easily borrowed from a 
commercial banks and thereby effectively finance its fiscal stance. This was unlikely 
to happen before 2005 ease on the Stability and Growth Pact criteria, as Germany was 
in the process of joining the EMU. However, the focus of policy only on improving 
supply of labour and international competitiveness coupled with not appropriate fiscal 
policy was a good recipe for depressing domestic demand.   
On the other hand the policy conduct did result in restoring international 
competitiveness, due to increased cost competitiveness of German exports. However, 
this increase did materialize only from 2005, and was not sufficient to compensate for 
the lack of domestic demand. Furthermore, the logic of export-led growth for a 
country with large domestic market such as Germany is far from appropriate.   
 At this point it is useful to draw attention on the problem of viewing the 
potential growth rate as independent of actual has a serious consequence on conduct 
of economic policy. Firstly, it implies unidirectional causality from improving 
quantity and quality of factor inputs, which is desirable to a certain extent, but ignores 
the possible influence of demand components. Secondly, growth policy is subdued to 
price stability policy, which can have a serious negative effect on growth of living 
standards and employment. Thirdly, it results in decoupling of employment policy, 
fiscal and monetary policy. Viewing the potential growth rate as endogenous gives a 
possibility to widen the scope of policies that can be used to stimulate growth in the 
long run as it couples employment policy with fiscal and monetary policy. 
Furthermore, this view is not against the supply side improvements and does 
acknowledge them as useful for long-term growth, and gives more scope for use of 
industrial policy.  
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Technical Note on Calculations  
 
All annual growth rates are calculated using the following formula: 
AYT=[(YT - YT-1)/YT-1 x 100] 
AY – annual growth rate of variable Y 
Y – numerical value of variable 
T – year  
 
Indexing variables: 
Starting index year is 1995 and index value is set to 100 
INDEX1995=100 
INDEXT = INDEXT-1 +(INDEXT-1/100) x AYT  
 
Average yearly growth rates for the period from 1991 to 2008 of GDP and 
inflation measured by GDP deflator are calculated using the following formula: 
AYGR Y=
! 
[ (Y
T 2
"Y
T1
(T 2"T1) ) "1]#100  
AYGR Y – Average yearly growth rate of variable Y i  
Y – numerical value of variable 
T1 – start year 
T2 – end year 
 
Excluding German variables for the EU and the euro area: 
The values for real GDP, employment and GVA for the EU 27 excluding Germany 
and the euro-area 16 excluding Germany are obtained by using EUROSTAT absolute 
numbers by subtracting Germany’s from the EU 27 and the euro-area 16 values for 
given variables.  
The values used are: 
• Real GDP at market prices in millions of national currency, chain linked 
volumes, references year 2000.  
• Real GVA at basic prices in millions of national currency, chain linked 
volumes, reference year 2000. 
• Total employment – domestic concept in 1000 persons  
Correlation Coefficients
1
2
3
4
5
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9
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34
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38
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40
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45
46
47
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49
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52
53
54
55
56
57
A B C D E F G H I
Correlation between GDP growth, and components of agregate demand
AD DD GFC PFC GFCF exports GDP
Row 1 Row 2 Row 3 Row 4 Row 5 Row 6 Row 7
Growth of aggregate demand Row 1 1
Growth of domestic demand Row 2 0.725581055 1
Growth of government final consumption Row 3 0.157808963 0.617955193 1
Growth of private final consumption Row 4 0.411661819 0.786375984 0.413102186 1
Growth of GFCF Row 5 0.832675818 0.810146433 0.351533976 0.316389097 1
Growth of exports of goods and services Row 6 0.792623314 0.203771769 -0.28535803 0.025673406 0.425248581 1
Real GDP Growth Row 7 0.942840194 0.776820117 0.35380504 0.472102214 0.798694204 0.691135764 1
Correlation between GDP growth, Government Investments and Gov. Consumption 
GDP Growth Gov. GFCF Gov Final Consumption Expenditure
Row 1 Row 2 Row 3
Real GDP Growth 1
Growth of Government Goss Fixed Capital Formation, volume 0.271053473 1
Growth of Government Final Consumption Expenditure, volume 0.35380504 0.510031614 1
Correlation between GDP growth, Investment growth and profit rate
Real GDP Net Inv. profit rate Growth of GFCF
Row 1 Row 2 Row 3 Row 4
Real GDP Growth Row 1 1
Net Investment Growth Row 2 0.70828881 1
profit rate Row 3 0.268539438 0.510744875 1
Growth of GFCF Row 4 0.798694204 0.943197682 0.431901114 1
Correlation between profits-volume and investemnts (annual growth rate)
profits GFCF
profits 1
GFCF 0.60380055 1
Correlation between after-tax profits and investemnts (annual growth rate)
profits GFCF
profits 1
GFCF -0.077109074 1
Correlation between growth of Investment ratio and growth of real GDP
Inv. Ratio Real GDP
Inv. Ratio 1
Real GDP 0.633965477 1
Correlation between growth of Investments and growth of real GDP
GFCF Real GDP
GFCF 1
Real GDP 0.789685883 1
Correlation between growth of Total of Employment and Change in Output Gap
EMP OG
Row 1 Row 2
Growth of Total Employment Row 1 1
Change in Output Gap of Total Economy Row 2 0.684213701 1
Correlation between GDP growth, Labour Productivity Growth and Employment Growth
LP GDP Growth of Total Employment
Row 1 Row 2 Row 3
Labour productivity growth 1
Annual Growth Rate - Real GDP 0.543724442 1
Growth of Total Employment -0.297956554 0.639099893 1
Statistical Annex
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
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51
52
A
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COUNTRY: Germany
TIME PERIOD
GDP and Growth Rate
Gross domestic product - value - market prices
Gross domestic product - volume - market prices
GDP deflator at market prices (Nominal GDP/Real GDP)
Annual Growth Rate - Real GDP
Accumulated Growth - Real GDP
Average Yearly Growth Rate of Real GDP (1991-2008)
Average Yearly Infaltion Measured by GDP deflator (1991-2008)
Average Yearly Growth Rate of Real GDP (1991-1997)
Average Yearly Growth Rate of Real GDP (1997-2008)
Sector Balances
Current account balance - as a percentage of GDP
Government net lending - as a percentage of GDP
Private Sector Excess Savings - as a percentage of GDP
Government primary balance - as a percentage of GDP
Private sector balance as percentage of GDP (using government primary balance)
Total employment
Labour productivity
Labour productivity growth
Accumulated rate of growth of labour productivity
Average Yearly Labour productivity Growth 1991-2008
Average Yearly Labour productivity Growth 1991-1997
Average Yearly Labour productivity Growth 1997-2008
Demand 
Gross fixed capital formation - total - volume (GFCF)
Government final consumption expenditure - volume
Private final consumption expenditure - volume
Exports of goods and services - volume - national accounts basis
Imports of goods and services - volume - national accounts basis
Aggregate Demand (priv. final consumption+gov. final consumption+GFCF+exports)
Domestic Demand (private final consumption + government final consumption + GFCF)
Net exports 
Growth of aggregate demand 
Growth of domestic demand 
Growth of government final consumption
Growth of private final consumption
Growth of GFCF
Growth of exports of goods and services
Growth of imports of goods and services
Growth of net exports
Average GFCF growth
Statistical Annex
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
A
Total employment
Growth of Total Employment
Accumulated growth rate of total employment
Average Annual Employment Growth for period 1991-2008
Income distribution
Indirect taxes - value
Total direct taxes - value
Wages - value
Nominal GDP less total direct and indirect taxes 
Wage Share
Profit Share 
After tax profits, value
After tax profits, volume (deflated by GDP def)
Annual growth rate of after tax profits, volume (deflated by GDP def)
Annual growth rate of investments (GFCF)
Annual growth rate of after tax profits, volume (deflated by GDP def) - accumulated growth
Annual growth rate of investments (GFCF) - accumulated growth
Compensation rate of the private sector
Compensation rate - total economy
Growth of compensation per employee - total economy
Growth of compensation per employee - private sector
Unemployment rate
Consumer Price Index
COUNTRY: GERMANY
TIME PERIOD
VARIABLE
Potential output of total economy, value
Potential output of total economy, volume
Capital stock total economy, volume
Smoothed capital stock total economy, volume
Gross domestic product - volume - market prices
Capital to Ouput Ratio (Capital Stock/Potential Output)
Net Investment Rate (Net Investments/GDP)
Warranted Growth Rate (Capital Stock with pot out)
Capital to Ouput Ratio (Capital Stock/GDP)
Warranted Growth Rate
Net Investement potential rate
Real GDP Growth
Potential Output Growth, volume
Growth of Total Employment
OECD STAN database
data extracted on 08 Apr 2010 14:26 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat
Statistical Annex
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
A
COUNTRY: GERMANY
Net Operating Sruplus and mixed income 
Net Capital Stock, volume
Gross Capital Stock, Volume
GFCF, volume
CFCC 
Net Investments, volume
Total Value Added, volume 
Annual Growth of Net Investments
Net Investment Rate (Net Investments/Total Value Added)
Growth of net investment rate
profit rate 
Net Investment Rate (Net Investments/GDP)
Growth of net investments rate
Growth of profit rate
Net Operating Sruplus and mixed income 
Net Capital Stock, volume
Gross Capital Stock, Volume
GFCF, volume
CFCC 
Net Investments, volume
Total Value Added, volume 
Annual Growth of Net Investments
Net Investment Rate (Net Investments/Total Value Added)
Gross domestic product - volume - market prices
Net Investment Rate (Net Investments/GDP)
Real GDP Growth
Net Investment Growth
profit rate 
Growth of GFCF
TIME PERIOD
Gross domestic product - volume - market prices
Potential output of total economy, volume
Real GDP minus Potntial GDP  absolute volume
Output Gap of Total Economy
Economic Outlook No 86: Annual and Quarterly data
COUNTRY Germany
TIME PERIOD
VARIABLE
Output gap of the total economy
Government primary balance, value
Cyclically adjusted government primary balance, value
Cyclically adjusted government primary balance, as a percentage of potential GDP
Change in Output Gap of Total Economy 
Change in Cyclically Adjusted Government Primary Balance to Potential GDP Ratio
Statistical Annex
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
A
Government final consumption expenditure - volume
Growth of Government Final Consumption Expenditure, volume
Government gross fixed capital formation, volume
Growth of Government Goss Fixed Capital Formation, volume
Average Yearly Growth of Governement GFCF
Average Yearly Growth of Government Final Consumption Expenditure 
Government Expenditures (Gov. GFCF+Gov. Fin. Con. Exp), volume
Growth of Government Expenditures, volume
Average Yearly Growth of Government Expenditure, volume
Real GDP Growth
Growth of Government Goss Fixed Capital Formation, volume
Growth of Government Final Consumption Expenditure, volume
Source: EUROSTAT
Date of extraction: Mon, 16 Mar 09 09:22:21
Last update: Fri Mar 13 23:20:48 MET 2009 
Time
Real unit labour cost
Growth of real unit labour cost
Time 
GDP market prices
Millions of national currency, chain-linked volumes, reference year 2000 (including 'euro fixed' series for euro area countries)
European Union (27 countries) 
Euro area 16 (BE, DE, IE, GR, ES, FR, IT, CY, LU, MT, NL, AT, PT, SK, SI, FI) 
Germany
EU 27 (excluding Germany)
Euro area 15 (BE, IE, GR, ES, FR, IT, CY, LU, MT, NL, AT, PT, SK, SI, FI)
GDP growth - EU27 (excluding Germany)
GDP growth - euro area 15 (BE, IE, GR, ES, FR, IT, CY, LU, MT, NL, AT, PT, SK, SI, FI)
GDP growth - Germany 
GDP (Index 1995=100)
Real GDP - EU27 (excluding Germany)
Real GDP - euro area 15 (BE, IE, GR, ES, FR, IT, CY, LU, MT, NL, AT, PT, SK, SI, FI)
Real GDP - Germany 
Gross value added (at basic prices)
Millions of national currency, chain-linked volumes, reference year 2000 (including 'euro fixed' series for euro area countries)
European Union (27 countries) 
Euro area 16 (BE, DE, IE, GR, ES, FR, IT, CY, LU, MT, NL, AT, PT, SK, SI, FI) 
Germany
EU 27 (excluding Germany)
Euro area 15 (BE, IE, GR, ES, FR, IT, CY, LU, MT, NL, AT, PT, SK, SI, FI)
GVA growth - Germany
GVA growth - EU27 (excluding Germany)
Statistical Annex
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
A
GVA growth - euro area 15 (BE, IE, GR, ES, FR, IT, CY, LU, MT, NL, AT, PT, SK, SI, FI)
GVA (Index 1995=100)
GVA - Germany
GVA - EU27 (excluding Germany)
GVA - euro area 15 (BE, IE, GR, ES, FR, IT, CY, LU, MT, NL, AT, PT, SK, SI, FI)
Total employment - domestic concept
1000 persons
European Union (27 countries) 
Euro area 16 (BE, DE, IE, GR, ES, FR, IT, CY, LU, MT, NL, AT, PT, SK, SI, FI) 
Germany
EU 27 (excluding Germany)
Euro area 15 (BE, IE, GR, ES, FR, IT, CY, LU, MT, NL, AT, PT, SK, SI, FI)
Employment growth - Germany
Employment growth - EU27 (excluding Germany)
Employment growth - euro area 15 (BE, IE, GR, ES, FR, IT, CY, LU, MT, NL, AT, PT, SK, SI, FI)
Total Employment (Index 1995=100) 
Employment - Germany
Employment - EU27 (excluding Germany)
Employment - euro area 15 (BE, IE, GR, ES, FR, IT, CY, LU, MT, NL, AT, PT, SK, SI, FI)
Labour productivity (GDP or GVA divided by total employment)
measured with real GDP
Germany
EU 27 (excluding Germany)
Euro area 15 (BE, IE, GR, ES, FR, IT, CY, LU, MT, NL, AT, PT, SK, SI, FI)
measured with GVA
Germany
EU 27 (excluding Germany)
Euro area 15 (BE, IE, GR, ES, FR, IT, CY, LU, MT, NL, AT, PT, SK, SI, FI)
Labour productivity growth - Germany, measured with real GDP
Labour productivity growth - EU 27 (excluding Germany), measured with real GDP
Labour productivity growth - euro area 15 (BE, IE, GR, ES, FR, IT, CY, LU, MT, NL, AT, PT, SK, SI, FI), measured with real GDP
Labour productivity growth - Germany, measured with GVA
Labour productivity growth - EU 27 (excluding Germany), measured with GVA
Labour productivity growth - euro area 15 (BE, IE, GR, ES, FR, IT, CY, LU, MT, NL, AT, PT, SK, SI, FI), measured with GVA
Labour Productivity (Index 1995=100) 
measured with real GDP
Germany
EU 27 (excluding Germany)
Statistical Annex
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
A
Euro area 15 (BE, IE, GR, ES, FR, IT, CY, LU, MT, NL, AT, PT, SK, SI, FI)
measured with GVA
Germany
EU 27 (excluding Germany)
Euro area 15 (BE, IE, GR, ES, FR, IT, CY, LU, MT, NL, AT, PT, SK, SI, FI)
Time 
GFCF
Germany 
EU 27 
EU 27 excluding Germany
Investment Ratio
EU 27
EU 27 (excluding Germany)
Germany
Average Annual Growth Rates (1995-2008)
Employment
Employment growth - Germany
Employment growth - EU27 (excluding Germany)
Employment growth - euro area 15 (BE, IE, GR, ES, FR, IT, CY, LU, MT, NL, AT, PT, SK, SI, FI)
Employment growth Germany (OECD data 1991-1996)
GDP Growth
GDP growth - EU27 (excluding Germany)
GDP growth - euro area 15 (BE, IE, GR, ES, FR, IT, CY, LU, MT, NL, AT, PT, SK, SI, FI)
GDP growth - Germany
Labour Productivity
Labour productivity growth - Germany, measured with real GDP
Labour productivity growth - EU 27 (excluding Germany), measured with real GDP
Labour productivity growth - euro area 15 (BE, IE, GR, ES, FR, IT, CY, LU, MT, NL, AT, PT, SK, SI, FI), measured with real GDP
Indexed values calculated with average annual growth rate (index 1995=100)
time
Labour productivity - Germany, measured with real GDP
Labour productivity - EU 27 (excluding Germany), measured with real GDP
Labour productivity - euro area 15 (BE, IE, GR, ES, FR, IT, CY, LU, MT, NL, AT, PT, SK, SI, FI), measured with real GDP
GDP - EU27 (excluding Germany)
GDP - euro area 15 (BE, IE, GR, ES, FR, IT, CY, LU, MT, NL, AT, PT, SK, SI, FI)
GDP - Germany
Employment - Germany
Employment - EU27 (excluding Germany)
Employment - euro area 15 (BE, IE, GR, ES, FR, IT, CY, LU, MT, NL, AT, PT, SK, SI, FI)
Statistical Annex
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
B C D E F G
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
1538640 1644630 1692330 1779470 1848740 1876980
1765087.52 1797520.34 1783237.52 1831345.27 1867645.3 1886671.86
0.871707483 0.91494375 0.949021082 0.971673681 0.989877468 0.994862986
1.837462428 -0.794584611 2.697775785 1.982151077 1.018745904
100 101.8374624 101.0282776 103.753794 105.810351 106.8882896
0.01507007
0.01367509
0.014276731
0.015503061
-1.31284771 -1.07805403 -0.973214444 -1.421771651 -1.168904227 -0.5642042
-2.84861956 -2.474720758 -3.00946033 -2.29787521 -9.667124636 -3.328751505
1.53577185 1.396666728 2.036245886 0.876103559 8.498220409 2.764547305
-0.865166641 -0.076082462 -0.511974615 0.231081446 -6.758116339 -0.433142601
-0.447681069 -1.001971568 -0.461239829 -1.652853097 5.589212112 -0.131061599
38622250 38054750 37558000 37512750 37599000 37492250
0.045701313 0.047235111 0.047479565 0.048819275 0.049672739 0.050321649
3.356136442 0.517527059 2.821655648 1.748209735 1.306372044
100 103.3561364 103.8910324 106.8224796 108.6899606 110.1098558
0.012561999
0.019461886
0.008818127
378465.7 392756.17 375501.42 392357.98 392756.17 390920.08
331742.03 349407.36 349769.87 359283.49 366004.76 373598.01
1025934.82 1056167.45 1065728.91 1086035.76 1111411.68 1125556.67
415959.68 407836.64 388234.75 419711.38 447591.19 475367.74
413928.78 420961.54 401787.46 435129.26 464588.58 481702.23
2152102.23 2206167.62 2179234.95 2257388.61 2317763.8 2365442.5
1736142.55 1798330.98 1791000.2 1837677.23 1870172.61 1890074.76
2030.9 -13124.9 -13552.71 -15417.88 -16997.39 -6334.49
2.512212907 -1.220789833 3.586288849 2.67455899 2.057099175
3.581988702 -0.407643536 2.606199039 1.7682855 1.064187867
5.325020167 0.103749961 2.719965559 1.870742794 2.074631488
2.946837305 0.905297735 1.905442351 2.336563945 1.272704818
3.775895676 -4.393247342 4.489080228 0.101486403 -0.467488518
-1.952843122 -4.806309212 8.107628181 6.642614742 6.205785686
1.699026581 -4.554829403 8.2983675 6.770245697 3.683614005
-746.2602787 3.259529596 13.76233978 10.24466399 -62.73257247
0.012819936
Statistical Annex
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
B C D E F G
38622250 38054750 37558000 37512750 37599000 37492250
-1.469360278 -1.305356099 -0.120480324 0.229921827 -0.283917125
100 98.53063972 97.24446401 97.12730356 97.35062043 97.07422535
0.002476955
167270 179750 190350 205900 205300 209520
170620 188460 189910 191710 200400 210670
691180 748830 768510 779990 805900 814950
1200750 1276420 1312070 1381860 1443040 1456790
57.56235686 58.66642641 58.57233227 56.44493653 55.84737776 55.94148779
42.43764314 41.33357359 41.42766773 43.55506347 44.15262224 44.05851221
509570 527590 543560 601870 637140 641840
584565.3613 576636.5421 572758.6147 619415.7685 643655.4229 645154.1661
-1.35636146 -0.67250809 8.1460414 3.913309208 0.232848689
3.775895676 -4.393247342 4.489080228 0.101486403 -0.467488518
100 98.64363854 97.98025209 105.961764 110.1083755 110.3647614
100 103.7758957 99.2167639 103.670684 103.7758957 103.2907553
23780.98654 26225.87599 27172.11742 27967.27534 28905.04762 29206.59266
24072.41753 26566.9997 27649.73292 28464.03149 29479.9353 29856.80527
10.36282362 4.075481736 2.945050422 3.56907912 1.278394841
10.28085799 3.608045065 2.926374515 3.353105616 1.043226231
6.274282829 7.522221949 8.108223968 7.899764844 8.560505826 9.254212241
0.819203452 0.860739009 0.898948126 0.92340196 0.939314933 0.952890407
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
1522159.551 1633678.409 1725524.783 1793162.339 1856135.619 1894917.495
1746187.297 1785566.517 1818209.721 1845437.149 1875106.394 1904688.295
1938688.074 2012579.283 2064928.551 2115105.851 2163062.457 2210004.185
1938688.074 2012579.283 2064928.551 2115105.851 2163062.457 2210004.185
1765087.52 1797520.34 1783237.52 1831345.27 1867645.3 1886671.86
1.110240624 1.127137669 1.135693274 1.146127275 1.153567853 1.160297037
9.654978185 9.364649248 7.595109372 7.698644942 7.004832234 6.569029974
8.696293378 8.308345558 6.687641414 6.717094262 6.072319211 5.661507153
1.098352377 1.119642008 1.157966074 1.154946522 1.158176265 1.171377085
8.790419526 8.363967395 6.559008541 6.665802089 6.048157304 5.607954992
9.759480858 9.427342715 7.449021883 7.639857584 6.976959835 6.506893561
1.837462428 -0.794584611 2.697775785 1.982151077 1.018745904
2.25515444 1.828170688 1.497485566 1.607708237 1.577611828
-1.469360278 -1.305356099 -0.120480324 0.229921827 -0.283917125
Statistical Annex
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
B C D E F G
3.3206E+11 3.3733E+11 3.3924E+11 3.7917E+11 4.0253E+11 4.116E+11
5.16186E+12 5.31928E+12 5.48199E+12 5.61179E+12 5.74823E+12 5.87326E+12
8.06843E+12 8.31951E+12 8.58351E+12 8.81525E+12 9.05504E+12 9.28059E+12
3.84849E+11 4.02801E+11 3.85529E+11 4.01759E+11 4.01305E+11 4.00036E+11
2.1443E+11 2.3447E+11 2.5009E+11 2.6077E+11 2.7048E+11 2.761E+11
1.70419E+11 1.68331E+11 1.35439E+11 1.40989E+11 1.30825E+11 1.23936E+11
1.57443E+12 1.60933E+12 1.59318E+12 1.63104E+12 1.66705E+12 1.68914E+12
-1.224829547 -19.54039493 4.097738876 -7.208623779 -5.266086667
10.82416751 10.45975382 8.5011826 8.644086955 7.847705066 7.337218541
-3.007038768 -18.89595466 1.363187353 -9.012140614 -6.221451786
6.432952463 6.341647742 6.188263751 6.756667659 7.002677346 7.008033017
9.654978185 9.364649248 7.595109372 7.698644942 7.004832234 6.569029974
-3.007038768 -18.89595466 1.363187353 -9.012140614 -6.221451786
-1.419328397 -2.418677245 9.185192011 3.640991384 0.076480341
332060 337330 339240 379170 402530 411600
5161860 5319280 5481990 5611790 5748230 5873260
8068430 8319510 8583510 8815250 9055040 9280590
384848.815 402801.475 385528.84 401758.77 401305.42 400036.04
214430 234470 250090 260770 270480 276100
170418.815 168331.475 135438.84 140988.77 130825.42 123936.04
1574428.84 1609325.4 1593176.46 1631042.94 1667053.22 1689142
-1.224829547 -19.54039493 4.097738876 -7.208623779 -5.266086667
10.82416751 10.45975382 8.5011826 8.644086955 7.847705066 7.337218541
1765087.52 1797520.34 1783237.52 1831345.27 1867645.3 1886671.86
9.654978185 9.364649248 7.595109372 7.698644942 7.004832234 6.569029974
1.837462428 -0.794584611 2.697775785 1.982151077 1.018745904
-1.224829547 -19.54039493 4.097738876 -7.208623779 -5.266086667
6.432952463 6.341647742 6.188263751 6.756667659 7.002677346 7.008033017
3.775895676 -4.393247342 4.489080228 0.101486403 -0.467488518
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
1765087.52 1797520.34 1783237.52 1831345.27 1867645.3 1886671.86
1746187.297 1785566.517 1818209.721 1845437.149 1875106.394 1904688.295
18900.22294 11953.82259 -34972.2011 -14091.87923 -7461.094293 -18016.43456
1.082 0.669 -1.923 -0.764 -0.398 -0.946
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
1.079417023 0.695460654 -1.90926166 -0.755221018 -0.397902984 -0.932362246
-13311.8 -1251.275 -8664.3 4112.025 -124940 -8130
-17169.29315 -7948.625441 3736.268906 13211.02853 -120134.3448 1672.756394
-1.127956208 -0.486547744 0.216529426 0.736744702 -6.472282715 0.088275949
-0.413 -2.593 1.160 0.366 -0.548
0.641408464 0.70307717 0.520215276 -7.209027417 6.560558664
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157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
B C D E F G
331742.03 349407.36 349769.87 359283.49 366004.76 373598.01
5.325020167 0.103749961 2.719965559 1.870742794 2.074631488
42488.78 46629.49 44638.22 43817.81 38852.07 37728.14
9.74541985 -4.270409134 -1.837909307 -11.33269782 -2.892844577
-1.88%
1.38%
374230.81 396036.85 394408.09 403101.3 404856.83 411326.15
5.826895974 -0.41126476 2.204115539 0.435505914 1.59792784
1.15%
1.837462428 -0.794584611 2.697775785 1.982151077 1.018745904
9.74541985 -4.270409134 -1.837909307 -11.33269782 -2.892844577
5.325020167 0.103749961 2.719965559 1.870742794 2.074631488
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
1.4 -0.2 -2.2 0 -0.5
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Millions of national currency, chain-linked volumes, reference year 2000 (including 'euro fixed' series for euro area countries)
7981738.1 8127658.4 8348266.4 8595617.1 8856953.8 9201966.8
5921648.5 6013728.1 6168582.2 6342643.8 6527276.9 6779434.1
1867387.5 1885950 1919981.3 1958962.5 1998356.3 2062500
6114350.6 6241708.4 6428285.1 6636654.6 6858597.5 7139466.8
4054261 4127778.1 4248600.9 4383681.3 4528920.6 4716934.1
2.082932569 2.989192831 3.241447707 3.344198446 4.0951419
1.813329236 2.927066259 3.179409014 3.313181093 4.151397576
0.994035785 1.804464593 2.030290608 2.010952226 3.209822993
100 102.0829326 105.1343883 108.5422645 112.1721332 116.7657412
100 101.8133292 104.7934728 108.125286 111.7076725 116.3451021
100 100.9940358 102.8164374 104.9039099 107.0134774 110.4484206
Millions of national currency, chain-linked volumes, reference year 2000 (including 'euro fixed' series for euro area countries)
7125994 7257971.6 7453452 7671329.3 7895359.5 8210977.7
5310573.7 5396076.4 5534573.2 5686850.1 5841704 6073212.2
1667053.2 1689142 1721254.3 1756893.3 1790304.9 1856200
5458940.8 5568829.6 5732197.7 5914436 6105054.6 6354777.7
3643520.5 3706934.4 3813318.9 3929956.8 4051399.1 4217012.2
1.325020701 1.901101269 2.070524965 1.901743265 3.680663556
2.013005893 2.933616428 3.179204723 3.22293791 4.090431886
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209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
B C D E F G
1.740456792 2.86987814 3.058697766 3.090168828 4.087800187
100 101.3250207 103.251312 105.3891561 107.3933873 111.3461766
100 102.0130059 105.0056762 108.3440216 111.8358822 116.4104527
100 101.7404568 104.6602839 107.8615257 111.1946289 115.7400432
198075 199337 201158 204148 206284 209456
126022 126712 127824 130191 132613 135733
37601 37498 37463 37911 38424 39144
160474 161839 163695 166237 167860 170312
88421 89214 90361 92280 94189 96589
-0.273928885 -0.093338311 1.195846569 1.353169265 1.873828857
0.850605082 1.146818752 1.552887993 0.976316945 1.460741094
0.896845772 1.285672652 2.12370381 2.068703945 2.548068246
100 99.72607112 99.63298848 100.8244462 102.1887716 104.1036143
100 100.8506051 102.0071787 103.591236 104.6026148 106.1305881
100 100.8968458 102.1940489 104.3643478 106.5233372 109.2376245
49.66324034 50.29468238 51.25006807 51.67266756 52.00802363 52.69006744
38.10181462 38.56739352 39.26989279 39.9228487 40.85903431 41.91992813
45.8517886 46.2682774 47.01808192 47.50413199 48.0833282 48.83510648
44.33534215 45.04618913 45.94544751 46.3425734 46.59340256 47.41978336
34.01760285 34.40968864 35.0175491 35.57833695 36.36991898 37.31256576
41.20650637 41.55103907 42.20093735 42.58730819 43.01350582 43.65934216
1.271447532 1.899575937 0.824583288 0.649000881 1.311420363
1.221933656 1.821484948 1.662739237 2.344986996 2.596473058
Labour productivity growth - euro area 15 (BE, IE, GR, ES, FR, IT, CY, LU, MT, NL, AT, PT, SK, SI, FI), measured with real GDP 0.908337081 1.620558529 1.033751387 1.219254385 1.563490524
1.603341602 1.996302896 0.86434219 0.541249972 1.773600462
1.152596764 1.766538679 1.601448036 2.2248989 2.591830854
Labour productivity growth - euro area 15 (BE, IE, GR, ES, FR, IT, CY, LU, MT, NL, AT, PT, SK, SI, FI), measured with GVA 0.836112381 1.564096329 0.915550377 1.000762079 1.501473375
100 101.2714475 103.1951756 104.0461058 104.7213659 106.0947032
100 101.2219337 103.0656759 104.7793894 107.2364524 110.020818
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261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
B C D E F G
100 100.9083371 102.5436157 103.6036618 104.866854 106.5064373
100 101.6033416 103.6316521 104.5273841 105.0931386 106.957071
100 101.1525968 102.9394965 104.5880191 106.9149967 109.6860526
100 100.8361124 102.4132863 103.3509315 104.3852285 105.9525449
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
392523.9 390488.7 394382.1 410044.1 429511 442430
1507737.4 1548673.1 1604261.5 1720956.8 1814747.5 1898409.3
1115213.5 1158184.4 1209879.4 1310912.7 1385236.5 1455979.3
0.18889838 0.190543576 0.192167023 0.200213292 0.20489522 0.206304733
0.182392796 0.185555673 0.188211845 0.19752613 0.201970811 0.203933899
0.235459732 0.231175769 0.229124831 0.233391578 0.239909414 0.238352548
0.005404163
0.011268974
0.015285823
-0.005921258
0.025738421
0.023928583
0.015159706
0.009703107
0.014308208
0.008512637
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
100 100.97 101.949409 102.9383183 103.93682 104.9450071
100 101.43 102.880449 104.3516394 105.8438679 107.3574352
100 100.85 101.707225 102.5717364 103.4435962 104.3228667
100 102.57 105.206049 107.9098445 110.6831275 113.5276838
100 102.39 104.837121 107.3427282 109.9082194 112.5350258
100 101.52 103.063104 104.6296632 106.2200341 107.8345786
100 100.54 101.082916 101.6287637 102.1775591 102.7293179
100 101.13 102.272769 103.4284513 104.5971928 105.7791411
100 101.53 103.083409 104.6605852 106.2618921 107.8876991
Statistical Annex
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
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1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
1917480 1963120 2007020 2062360 2116130 2146430
1921785.97 1956745.3 1993560.96 2062448.37 2090962.54 2091168.77
0.997759391 1.003257808 1.006751256 0.999957153 1.012036304 1.026426002
1.861166785 1.819106318 1.881474303 3.455495537 1.382539821 0.009862922
108.8776589 110.8582593 112.944029 116.8468049 118.4622585 118.4739423
-0.454242026 -0.776315253 -1.288975695 -1.784848426 0.028353646 2.003792344
-2.639401715 -2.17663719 -1.459875836 1.313543707 -2.816934687 -3.649781265
2.185159689 1.400321937 0.170900141 -3.098392133 2.845288333 5.653573609
0.236247575 0.753392559 1.259578878 3.976027464 -0.265106586 -1.17217892
-0.690489601 -1.529707812 -2.548554573 -5.76087589 0.293460232 3.175971264
37458500 37908000 38422750 39144250 39316250 39093750
0.051304403 0.051618268 0.051884911 0.052688412 0.053183163 0.053491128
1.952943401 0.611770445 0.516567083 1.548621857 0.939013369 0.57906374
112.260239 112.947014 113.5304611 115.2886186 116.3711941 117.0450575
394183.02 408451.38 426579.94 442441.06 427453.75 401140.2
375498.77 382220.04 386619.22 391919.8 393987.13 399787.4
1135816.32 1151509.32 1184989.8 1214342.08 1237714.71 1228122.88
531488.7 571036.71 603081.26 688389.99 735045.65 766952.5
521702.15 568428.34 615375.91 681139.98 691595.52 681872.21
2436986.81 2513217.45 2601270.22 2737092.93 2794201.24 2796002.98
1905498.11 1942180.74 1998188.96 2048702.94 2059155.59 2029050.48
9786.55 2608.37 -12294.65 7250.01 43450.13 85080.29
3.02456348 3.128069454 3.503587403 5.22139949 2.08645857 0.064481397
0.816017987 1.925094011 2.883780013 2.527988144 0.510208181 -1.462012397
0.508771447 1.789957927 1.150954827 1.371007887 0.527488022 1.472197835
0.911517854 1.381649455 2.907530093 2.477006975 1.924715481 -0.774962915
0.834682117 3.619729739 4.438364243 3.718205783 -3.387413908 -6.155882362
11.80579902 7.440987927 5.611644477 14.1454785 6.77750413 4.340798425
8.303868554 8.956487912 8.259188836 10.68681255 1.535006064 -1.405924376
-254.4962578 -73.34740026 -571.3537573 -158.9688198 499.3113113 95.81135891
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53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
H I J K L M
37458500 37908000 38422750 39144250 39316250 39093750
-0.090018604 1.199994661 1.357892793 1.877793755 0.439400423 -0.565923759
96.98684049 98.15067739 99.48345837 101.3515525 101.7968917 101.2207989
214400 224420 242130 245090 247740 250300
209960 222190 237260 253950 229950 227150
813740 830750 855530 884520 903200 909050
1493120 1516510 1527630 1563320 1638440 1668980
54.49930347 54.78038391 56.00374436 56.57958703 55.12560728 54.46739925
45.50069653 45.21961609 43.99625564 43.42041297 44.87439272 45.53260075
679380 685760 672100 678800 735240 759930
680905.643 683533.1803 667592.9095 678829.0859 726495.6774 740365.1102
5.541540114 0.385888611 -2.332040532 1.683088035 7.021884088 1.909086749
0.834682117 3.619729739 4.438364243 3.718205783 -3.387413908 -6.155882362
116.4806689 116.9301545 114.2032959 116.1254379 124.2796316 126.6522376
104.1529047 107.9229584 112.7129724 116.9038727 112.9438546 105.9911638
29374.27376 29607.5078 29890.50032 30489.3541 30985.26869 31374.02877
30080.10701 30360.20356 30692.47349 31271.39573 31762.14197 32189.95783
0.747909018 0.931168752 1.094425887 1.886202602 1.569313525 1.346936419
0.574120729 0.794007857 0.955813375 2.00349198 1.626517204 1.254660991
8.930823654 8.156996791 7.436878166 7.531971189 8.265626375 9.218345269
0.971050975 0.98013126 0.985705295 1 1.019778837 1.034073541
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
1930493.063 1974066.589 2016199.515 2038717.676 2097793.835 2155238.661
1934821.071 1967649.815 2002692.724 2038797.662 2072873.757 2099753.485
2259137.561 2317577.096 2385487.717 2461127.833 2524751.864 2565382.893
2259137.561 2317577.096 2385487.717 2461127.833 2524751.864 2565382.893
1921785.97 1956745.3 1993560.96 2062448.37 2090962.54 2091168.77
1.167620921 1.177840223 1.191140153 1.207146682 1.217995961 1.221754321
6.331691036 6.673299279 7.239886961 7.024175834 5.907367427 4.448513259
5.422728321 5.665708429 6.07811511 5.818825449 4.850071442 3.641086578
1.175540667 1.18440407 1.196596324 1.193303973 1.207459156 1.226769895
5.386194808 5.63430965 6.050400469 5.886325694 4.892395239 3.626200216
6.289033742 6.636316535 7.206874939 7.105658532 5.958917641 4.430325781
1.861166785 1.819106318 1.881474303 3.455495537 1.382539821 0.009862922
1.582031895 1.696732795 1.780952526 1.802819665 1.671381924 1.296737325
-0.090018604 1.199994661 1.357892793 1.877793755 0.439400423 -0.565923759
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106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
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4.3243E+11 4.4659E+11 4.4283E+11 4.3531E+11 4.5517E+11 4.7103E+11
5.98971E+12 6.10313E+12 6.22202E+12 6.34843E+12 6.47858E+12 6.58227E+12
9.49921E+12 9.71394E+12 9.93283E+12 1.01587E+13 1.03905E+13 1.05978E+13
4.04842E+11 4.20799E+11 4.41382E+11 4.5335E+11 4.39931E+11 4.14906E+11
2.8316E+11 2.9022E+11 2.9705E+11 3.0848E+11 3.1641E+11 3.2188E+11
1.21682E+11 1.30579E+11 1.44332E+11 1.4487E+11 1.23521E+11 93025920000
1.72125E+12 1.75689E+12 1.7903E+12 1.8562E+12 1.88367E+12 1.88868E+12
-1.819075388 7.312464379 10.53158663 0.373057701 -14.7367709 -24.68807693
7.0693536 7.432407534 8.061842427 7.804654671 6.557450328 4.925437216
-3.612998249 5.395213394 8.490368227 -2.979481969 -15.89949388 -24.69550415
7.219548192 7.317392879 7.117142021 6.856970936 7.025767992 7.156041913
6.331691036 6.673299279 7.239886961 7.024175834 5.907367427 4.448513259
-3.612998249 5.395213394 8.490368227 -2.979481969 -15.89949388 -24.69550415
3.018181762 1.355274379 -2.736642144 -3.655555622 2.461685456 1.854230319
432430 446590 442830 435310 455170 471030
5989710 6103130 6222020 6348430 6478580 6582270
9499210 9713940 9932830 10158720 10390480 10597760
404841.55 420799.47 441381.56 453350 439930.84 414905.92
283160 290220 297050 308480 316410 321880
121681.55 130579.47 144331.56 144870 123520.84 93025.92
1721254.26 1756893.3 1790304.9 1856200 1883671.76 1888683.5
-1.819075388 7.312464379 10.53158663 0.373057701 -14.7367709 -24.68807693
7.0693536 7.432407534 8.061842427 7.804654671 6.557450328 4.925437216
1921785.97 1956745.3 1993560.96 2062448.37 2090962.54 2091168.77
6.331691036 6.673299279 7.239886961 7.024175834 5.907367427 4.448513259
1.861166785 1.819106318 1.881474303 3.455495537 1.382539821 0.009862922
-1.819075388 7.312464379 10.53158663 0.373057701 -14.7367709 -24.68807693
7.219548192 7.317392879 7.117142021 6.856970936 7.025767992 7.156041913
0.834682117 3.619729739 4.438364243 3.718205783 -3.387413908 -6.155882362
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
1921785.97 1956745.3 1993560.96 2062448.37 2090962.54 2091168.77
1934821.071 1967649.815 2002692.724 2038797.662 2072873.757 2099753.485
-13035.10089 -10904.51452 -9131.76359 23650.70816 18088.78256 -8584.715155
-0.674 -0.554 -0.456 1.160 0.873 -0.409
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
-0.668381748 -0.548947503 -0.450824207 1.180267596 0.872638891 -0.406389379
4530 14790 25280 82000 -5610 -25160
14699.03906 22799.6185 29945.19399 20330.12788 -15411.06499 -22790.99905
0.761413721 1.154956911 1.485229699 0.997201727 -0.734632009 -1.057469851
0.272 0.120 0.098 1.616 -0.287 -1.281
0.673137772 0.39354319 0.330272788 -0.488027972 -1.731833736 -0.322837842
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159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
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201
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375498.77 382220.04 386619.22 391919.8 393987.13 399787.4
0.508771447 1.789957927 1.150954827 1.371007887 0.527488022 1.472197835
34743.56 35425.09 37878.99 36791.85 36909.57 36571.1
-7.910753088 1.961600941 6.927011336 -2.870034285 0.319962166 -0.917025043
410242.33 417645.13 424498.21 428711.65 430896.7 436358.5
-0.263494067 1.804494431 1.640885888 0.992569556 0.509678242 1.267542778
1.861166785 1.819106318 1.881474303 3.455495537 1.382539821 0.009862922
-7.910753088 1.961600941 6.927011336 -2.870034285 0.319962166 -0.917025043
0.508771447 1.789957927 1.150954827 1.371007887 0.527488022 1.472197835
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
-1.4 -0.4 0.1 1.3 -0.4 -0.6
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
9384421 9501465.4 9628823.3 9866834.9 10062514.1 10378699.7
6907664.8 6972327.8 7028624.8 7180367.1 7304772.7 7518536.7
2088075 2088075 2083537.5 2108700 2124993.8 2187900
7296346 7413390.4 7545285.8 7758134.9 7937520.3 8190799.7
4819589.8 4884252.8 4945087.3 5071667.1 5179778.9 5330636.7
2.197351769 1.6041509 1.779150873 2.820954774 2.312223264 3.190913414
2.17632254 1.341670198 1.245523164 2.559708097 2.131681711 2.912437054
1.24 0 -0.217305413 1.207681647 0.772694077 2.960300402
119.3314953 121.2457526 123.4028974 126.8840374 129.8178796 133.9602557
118.8771468 120.472086 121.9725938 125.0947361 127.7613577 131.4823269
111.817981 111.817981 111.5749945 112.9224652 113.7950104 117.1636846
8377717.3 8483104.4 8591035.7 8811445.2 8983674.2 9263013
6195031.1 6258581.1 6304424.7 6450089.8 6561029.2 6750206
1883671.8 1888683.5 1885899.2 1915969.6 1934346 1990774.5
6494045.5 6594420.9 6705136.5 6895475.6 7049328.2 7272238.5
4311359.3 4369897.6 4418525.5 4534120.2 4626683.2 4759431.5
1.480002155 0.266060149 -0.147420147 1.594486068 0.959117514 2.917187515
2.191544796 1.54565286 1.67892832 2.838705819 2.231210854 3.162149551
Statistical Annex
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
H I J K L M
2.237297298 1.357768999 1.112792666 2.616137442 2.041476536 2.869189315
112.9941024 113.2947347 113.1277154 114.9315211 116.0338494 119.4187744
118.96164 120.8003739 122.8285256 126.3152661 129.1336261 133.2170244
118.329492 119.9361332 121.2707737 124.4433838 126.9838663 130.6272738
211499 212277 213060 214528 216597 220163
137807 138792 139399 140508 141863 144179
39316 39096 38726 38880 38851 39097
172183 173181 174334 175648 177746 181066
98491 99696 100673 101628 103012 105082
0.439403229 -0.559568623 -0.946388377 0.397665651 -0.074588477 0.633188335
1.098572033 0.579615874 0.665777424 0.753725607 1.194434323 1.867833875
1.969168332 1.223462042 0.979979137 0.948615816 1.361829417 2.009474624
104.5610489 103.9759581 102.9919417 103.4015053 103.3243797 103.9786176
107.2965091 107.9184167 108.6369131 109.4557374 110.7631143 112.8319852
111.3886973 112.7514957 113.8564368 114.936497 116.501736 118.8428088
53.11005697 53.40891651 53.80203223 54.23611111 54.69598723 55.96081541
42.37553069 42.80718093 43.28063258 44.16864923 44.65653404 45.23654192
48.93431684 48.99146204 49.12029343 49.90423013 50.28325729 50.72835214
47.91107437 48.30886791 48.69852812 49.2790535 49.78883426 50.91885567
37.71595047 38.07820084 38.46143896 39.25735334 39.65956027 40.16346802
43.77414485 43.83222597 43.88987613 44.61487189 44.91402167 45.29254772
0.797094313 0.562717414 0.736048845 0.8068076 0.847915001 2.312469778
1.086840016 1.01863088 1.106009885 2.051764493 1.104595276 1.298819744
0.203153768 0.116779404 0.262967005 1.59595282 0.759509076 0.885175061
1.036046504 0.830274729 0.806601816 1.192079925 1.034477593 2.269628159
1.081096144 0.96046995 1.006450178 2.069382744 1.024539084 1.27058329
0.262951018 0.132683623 0.131524616 1.651851898 0.670515837 0.842779255
106.9403781 107.5421502 108.3337129 109.2077576 110.1337465 112.6805561
111.2165683 112.3494546 113.5920507 115.922692 117.2031686 118.7254265
Statistical Annex
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
H I J K L M
106.7228091 106.8474394 107.1284129 108.8381318 109.6647673 110.6354925
108.065196 108.962434 109.841327 111.1507234 112.3005527 114.8493577
110.8718643 111.9367552 113.0633429 115.4030562 116.5854056 118.0667203
106.2311482 106.3720995 106.512005 108.2714256 108.9974026 109.9160101
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
426281.3 400399.2 399204.6 398010 401416.7 432873.5
1912409.1 1902922.5 1928065.5 1985896.2 2055886.3 2183401.7
1486127.8 1502523.3 1528860.9 1587886.2 1654469.6 1750528.2
0.203785519 0.200276738 0.200238953 0.201269832 0.204311396 0.210373338
0.203681103 0.202676943 0.202624651 0.204673703 0.208436582 0.213718839
0.226303383 0.211999099 0.211678652 0.207732941 0.20752063 0.217439745
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
105.9629737 106.9908145 108.0286254 109.0765031 110.1345452 111.2028503
108.8926465 110.4498113 112.0292436 113.6312618 115.2561889 116.9043524
105.2096111 106.1038928 107.0057759 107.915325 108.8326052 109.7576824
116.4453453 119.4379907 122.507547 125.655991 128.88535 132.1977035
115.224613 117.9784812 120.7981669 123.6852431 126.6413204 129.668048
109.4736642 111.1376639 112.8269564 114.5419261 116.2829634 118.0504644
103.2840562 103.8417901 104.4025358 104.9663095 105.5331275 106.1030064
106.9744454 108.1832566 109.4057274 110.6420121 111.8922669 113.1566495
109.5383809 111.2143181 112.9158971 114.6435104 116.3975561 118.1784387
Statistical Annex
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
N O P Q R S
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
2166630 2203140 2239290 2322080 2426490 2499473.66
2086270.26 2101326.6 2121229.74 2188467.23 2245082.8 2276138.184
1.038518375 1.048451964 1.055656517 1.061053128 1.080802009 1.09812035
-0.234247473 0.72168694 0.94717023 3.169741058 2.586996471 1.38326232
118.1964201 119.0494282 120.177029 123.9863296 127.1938516 128.9532762
1.826800146 4.597075084 5.200755597 6.079893888 7.661272043 6.389514805
-4.028375865 -3.79140681 -3.316676268 -1.546888996 0.129405025 -0.012400054
5.855176011 8.388481894 8.517431865 7.626782884 7.531867018 6.401914859
-1.471409516 -1.315395299 -0.940923239 0.863019362 2.511760458 2.372840553
3.298209662 5.912470383 6.141678836 5.216874526 5.149511585 4.016674252
38727000 38879500 38850250 39094500 39765500 40281194.13
0.053871208 0.054047161 0.054600157 0.055978903 0.056458055 0.056506224
0.710547883 0.326618658 1.023172437 2.525169334 0.855951353 0.085317856
117.8767187 118.2617261 119.4717475 122.4886114 123.5370543 123.6424535
399912.48 394636.5 399879.29 433791.58 453523.94 469974.8582
401325.64 398445.09 400091.12 402589.55 411368.31 418979.0265
1229458.43 1227424.72 1230217.25 1244726.47 1240719.78 1233152.848
785005.54 858508.38 926538.52 1047488.63 1128253.98 1175950.874
717836.43 764596.66 816090.86 915418.09 963336.32 1015374.036
2815702.09 2879014.69 2956726.18 3128596.23 3233866.01 3298057.606
2030696.55 2020506.31 2030187.66 2081107.6 2105612.03 2122106.732
67169.11 93911.72 110447.66 132070.54 164917.66 160576.8372
0.704545386 2.24855464 2.699239093 5.812849738 3.364760815 1.984980078
0.081125138 -0.501810081 0.479154653 2.508139568 1.177470593 0.783368546
0.384764502 -0.717758776 0.413113385 0.624465247 2.180573241 1.850097904
0.108747262 -0.165415109 0.227511305 1.179403069 -0.321893211 -0.60988246
-0.306057583 -1.319283659 1.328511174 8.480631743 4.548811206 3.627353867
2.353866765 9.363353028 7.924225504 13.05397535 7.710379634 4.227496162
5.274334321 6.51405084 6.734818852 12.17109943 5.234573199 5.401822331
-21.05209091 39.81385193 17.60796203 19.57749037 24.87089096 -2.632115175
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53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
N O P Q R S
38727000 38879500 38850250 39094500 39765500 40281194.13
-0.938129496 0.393782116 -0.075232449 0.628696083 1.716353963 1.296838029
100.2712167 100.6660668 100.5903333 101.2227408 102.9600813 104.2953068
255740 260200 265560 280460 305460 317277.5654
226050 221080 227600 250080 270840 273827.9883
908990 914930 912950 926750 957970 998401.9391
1684840 1721860 1746130 1791540 1850190 1908368.107
53.95111702 53.13614347 52.28419419 51.72923853 51.77684454 52.31705223
46.04888298 46.86385653 47.71580581 48.27076147 48.22315546 47.68294777
775850 806930 833180 864790 892220 909966.1676
747073.9264 769639.457 789252.9305 815029.8766 825516.6004 828657.9584
0.906149707 3.02052177 2.548397606 3.265993078 1.286667416 0.380532383
-0.306057583 -1.319283659 1.328511174 8.480631743 4.548811206 3.627353867
127.7998964 131.6601201 135.0153435 139.4249353 141.2188705 141.756254
105.6667698 104.2727254 105.6580002 114.6184661 119.8322437 124.1789832
31888.44112 31926.83603 31882.56838 32285.33887 32706.69291 33473.75294
32699.07227 32828.12545 32793.85329 33131.37135 33510.87326 34310.47182
1.581594012 0.394669241 -0.104398773 1.029211342 1.145445826 2.386086927
1.639612032 0.120403845 -0.138653406 1.263293745 1.305094059 2.345269302
9.681278602 10.53019443 9.753113494 8.312101544 7.358375716
1.044861998 1.062303335 1.078845635 1.095837454 1.120920615 ..
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
2201304.813 2238499.459 2268145.889 2300105.22 2369454.747 2434397.423
2119682.049 2135044.647 2149124.286 2168128.917 2191456.208 2218020.043
2595222.174 2621097.726 2656438.391 2707797.413 2766406.716 2823956.634
2595222.174 2621097.726 2656438.391 2707797.413 2766406.716 2823956.634
2086270.26 2101326.6 2121229.74 2188467.23 2245082.8 2276138.184
1.224345027 1.227654761 1.236056197 1.248909782 1.262360026 1.273188059
4.247378765 3.936169418 3.697944571 4.732890837 4.836995099 5.027889817
3.469102804 3.206251091 2.991728516 3.789617877 3.83170807 3.949055114
1.243953012 1.247353803 1.252310554 1.237303157 1.232206988 1.240678907
3.414420579 3.155615839 2.952897393 3.825166702 3.925472867 4.05253107
4.180428855 3.874006809 3.649947121 4.777288112 4.95536003 5.159634169
-0.234247473 0.72168694 0.94717023 3.169741058 2.586996471 1.38326232
0.949090628 0.724759549 0.659454079 0.884296506 1.075918092 1.212154486
-0.938129496 0.393782116 -0.075232449 0.628696083 1.716353963 1.296838029
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105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
N O P Q R S
4.7989E+11 5.1337E+11 5.3662E+11 5.7966E+11 6.0829E+11 6.1857E+11
6.64705E+12 6.71264E+12 6.77048E+12 6.82998E+12 6.92306E+12 7.0434E+12
1.07617E+13 1.09304E+13 1.10887E+13 1.12465E+13 1.14394E+13 1.16647E+13
4.11642E+11 4.10962E+11 4.14362E+11 4.46958E+11 4.68175E+11 4.82002E+11
3.2303E+11 3.2825E+11 3.3592E+11 3.4338E+11 3.5958E+11 3.6756E+11
88611800000 82711775000 78441900000 1.03578E+11 1.08595E+11 1.14442E+11
1.8859E+12 1.91597E+12 1.93323E+12 1.99374E+12 2.0511E+12 2.07932E+12
-4.745043102 -6.65828366 -5.162354453 32.04392678 4.843491265 5.384409502
4.698649854 4.316966891 4.057551697 5.195137549 5.29445137 5.50381769
-4.521386863 -7.327091934 -6.052200046 27.98706813 2.199591441 3.946555961
7.219593654 7.647810697 7.925878224 8.486994105 8.786432589 8.782264247
4.247378765 3.936169418 3.697944571 4.732890837 4.836995099 5.027889817
-4.521386863 -7.327091934 -6.052200046 27.98706813 2.199591441 3.946555961
0.888085097 5.931317794 3.635910169 7.079542042 3.528204214 -0.047440661
479890 513370 536620 579660 608290 618570
6647050 6712640 6770480 6829980 6923060 7043400
10761740 10930440 11088680 11246530 11439350 11664720
411641.8 410961.775 414361.9 446957.765 468174.545 482001.72
323030 328250 335920 343380 359580 367560
88611.8 82711.775 78441.9 103577.765 108594.545 114441.72
1885899.2 1915969.64 1933232.3 1993744.42 2051101 2079315.24
-4.745043102 -6.65828366 -5.162354453 32.04392678 4.843491265 5.384409502
4.698649854 4.316966891 4.057551697 5.195137549 5.29445137 5.50381769
2086270.26 2101326.6 2121229.74 2188467.23 2245082.8 2276138.184
4.247378765 3.936169418 3.697944571 4.732890837 4.836995099 5.027889817
-0.234247473 0.72168694 0.94717023 3.169741058 2.586996471 1.38326232
-4.745043102 -6.65828366 -5.162354453 32.04392678 4.843491265 5.384409502
7.219593654 7.647810697 7.925878224 8.486994105 8.786432589 8.782264247
-0.306057583 -1.319283659 1.328511174 8.480631743 4.548811206 3.627353867
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
2086270.26 2101326.6 2121229.74 2188467.23 2245082.8 2276138.184
2119682.049 2135044.647 2149124.286 2168128.917 2191456.208 2218020.043
-33411.78869 -33718.04674 -27894.54576 20338.31327 53626.59201 58118.14172
-1.576 -1.579 -1.298 0.938 2.447 2.620
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
-1.573830788 -1.559949427 -1.312344565 1.10928751 2.628252474 2.380160967
-31880 -28980 -20670 18120 62462.32909 58613.38107
-16343.7645 -11266.93303 -2316.110821 15056.38515 38777.42935 30591.59551
-0.742458037 -0.503325251 -0.10211472 0.654595495 1.636554967 1.256639332
-1.167 -0.003 0.281 2.236 1.509 0.173
0.315011814 0.239132786 0.401210531 0.756710215 0.981959472 -0.379915635
Statistical Annex
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
N O P Q R S
401325.64 398445.09 400091.12 402589.55 411368.31 418979.0265
0.384764502 -0.717758776 0.413113385 0.624465247 2.180573241 1.850097904
34711.37 32360.49 30948.68 32595.94 33008.92 35337.72
-5.085244906 -6.772651151 -4.362758413 5.322553337 1.266967604 7.055062692
436037.01 430805.58 431039.8 435185.49 444377.23 454316.7465
-0.073675659 -1.199767423 0.054367912 0.961788215 2.112143031 2.236729475
-0.234247473 0.72168694 0.94717023 3.169741058 2.586996471 1.38326232
-5.085244906 -6.772651151 -4.362758413 5.322553337 1.266967604 7.055062692
0.384764502 -0.717758776 0.413113385 0.624465247 2.180573241 1.850097904
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
-0.3 -1.4 -1.6 -1.8 -1.4 0.5
2007 2008
10679467.3 10778792.1  
7720341.1 7784185.4  
2241731.3 2270812.5  
8437736 8507979.6
5478609.8 5513372.9
3.014800862 0.832493456
2.775899172 0.634524109
2.460409525 1.297265199
137.9988907 139.1477224
135.1321437 135.9895897
120.046391 121.6037111
9547302.4 9635835.5
6947728.9 7012089.1
2048873.6 2077644.7
7498428.8 7558190.8
4898855.3 4934444.4
2.918416928 1.404239871
3.110325658 0.796993632
Statistical Annex
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
N O P Q R S
2.929421297 0.726477877
122.9039121 124.6297779
137.3605077 138.4552622
134.453897 135.4306748
224210 225970
146830 148027
39768 40330
184442 185640
107062 107697
1.716244213 1.41319654
1.864513492 0.64952668
1.884242782 0.59311427
105.7631446 107.2577857
114.9357528 115.6822912
121.0820959 121.8002511
56.37022983 56.30578973
45.74736774 45.83053006
51.1723095 51.19337493
51.52065983 51.5161096
40.65467085 40.71423616
45.75718089 45.81784451
0.731609113 -0.114315834
1.129232675 0.181786026
0.875166135 0.041165679
1.18188862 -0.008831857
1.223008998 0.146515295
1.025849029 0.132577272
113.5049373 113.3751832
120.0661128 120.2843762
Statistical Annex
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
N O P Q R S
111.6037369 111.6496793
116.2067491 116.1964859
119.5106869 119.6857884
111.0435825 111.190801
2007 2008
454685.3 468666.1
2314072.5 2307693.5
1859387.2 1839027.4
0.216684263 0.214095743
0.220365653 0.216153245
0.221919644 0.225575672
2007 2008
112.2815179 113.3706486
118.5760846 120.2717226
110.6906227 111.631493
135.5951844 139.0799807
132.7671143 135.9402483
119.8448315 121.6664729
106.6759627 107.2520129
114.4353196 115.7284387
119.9865688 121.8223633
